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IN MEMORIAM
RAY GARRETT, JR.
AUGUST 11, 1920 - FEBRUARY 3, 1980
With the death of Ray Garrett, Jr. on February 3, 1980, the 
accounting profession lost one of its more creative and dedicated 
advisers.
As a member and vice chairman of the Public Oversight Board 
of the SEC Practice Section for the past two years, Mr. Garrett was in 
the vanguard of the profession— making his manifold talents available 
in helping to resolve many of the substantive issues confronting the 
accounting profession's installations of a self-regulatory program.
His experience as a member of the staff and later as 
chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission permitted him to 
provide invaluable guidance to this Board and to the profession. His 
views and recommendations were given great weight by the Securities 
and Exchange Commission, this Board and leaders of the accounting 
profession.
The Board wishes to record its recognition of the many 
contributions Ray Garrett made to it during its formative period as 
well as to express its deep sense of personal loss at the passing of a 
colleague of such character and capacity.
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To Member Firms of the SEC Practice Section, 
The Securities and Exchange Commission and 
Other Interested Persons
Attached hereto is the second annual report of 
the Public Oversight Board covering its activities for 
the twelve months ended March 31, 1980.
The Board was saddened by the death of its Vice 
Chairman, Ray Garrett, Jr., on February 3, 1980, and the 
Board's tribute to him is included in the report.
During the Board's second year, the Executive 
Committee of the SEC Practice Section adopted procedures 
for dealing with alleged or possible audit failures of 
SEC clients involving member firms and established a 
permanent Special Investigations Committee to carry out 
such procedures. Copies of relevant documents are 
annexed to the Board's annual report. This important 
step was taken at the suggestion of the Board and 
involved extensive discussion and consultation between 
the Board and the Executive Committee. The Board 
believes that a reasonable self-policing mechanism has 
been developed. The next few years will provide the 
opportunity to test and improve these procedures. The 
Board regards effective implementation of the Section's 
investigative and monitoring procedures to be essential 
features of the Section's self-regulatory program and 
intends to give particular attention to monitoring these 
procedures and to offer comments from time to time as 
appropriate.
This past year has seen an increase in peer review 
activity. The peer review process and the Board's 
monitoring program have been improved through experience 
with 40 peer reviews. Discussions were held with the 
SEC's staff regarding its access to peer review papers,
2and progress was made with respect to the international 
aspects of peer reviews. The next year will see a sharp 
increase in peer reviews with 200 firms scheduled for 
initial reviews. This will provide the opportunity for 
further improvement in the peer review program of the 
Section and the Board.
The Section also studied the auditor's work 
environment in relation to possible substandard auditing 
as noted by the Cohen Commission. A position paper 
prepared by the Section's special task force on this 
topic, which is annexed to the Board's annual report, 
contains some practical observations and suggestions 
for firms in dealing with the problem should it exist.
The Board continues to be concerned that the 
Section's membership does not include all firms that 
audit SEC clients, although the percentage of SEC clients 
audited by member firms is very high. The Board has urged 
the Section to continue its efforts to increase its 
membership to the greatest possible extent. Among other 
things, the Board would favor the imposition by the SEC 
of a requirement that SEC registrants disclose in their 
proxy statements whether their auditing firms are members 
of the Section.
The Board believes that progress made during the 
past year is evidence of the continued strong commitment 
of the Section to the success of its self-regulatory 
program. The Board noted with appreciation that the SEC 
continues to be supportive with its constructive criticism 
and comments. The Section will face many challenges in 
1980-1981 to make its program more effective. The Board 
believes, however, that the experience thus far gained, 
together with the continued encouragement and support 
of the SEC, will enable the profession to make continued 
progress in 1980 and the years ahead.
PUBLIC OVERSIGHT BOARD
John J. McCloy 
Chairman
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Public Oversight Board
SEC PRACTICE SECTION 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants
ANNUAL REPORT 
1979-1980
This second annual report of the Public Oversight Board 
("Board") of the SEC Practice Section ("Section") of the Division 
for CPA Firms of the American Institute of Certified Public Accoun­
tants ("AICPA") covers its activities for the period April 1, 1979 
through March 31, 1980.
I. PUBLIC OVERSIGHT BOARD
The responsibilities and functions of the Board were not 
changed during the year. Its primary responsibilities are to (1) 
monitor and evaluate the performance of the Section's Peer Review, 
Special Investigations and Executive Committees, with special 
emphasis on the regulatory and sanction activities; (2) see that 
the Peer Review Committee is taking the necessary steps to ensure 
appropriate action on the part of member firms as a result of peer 
reviews; (3) make recommendations for improvement in the operation 
of the Section; and (4) publish an annual report and such other 
reports as may be deemed desirable with respect to its activities. 
The Board does not have line authority or responsibility; it acts 
purely in an oversight and advisory capacity.
A. Meetings and Other Activities
The Board normally meets on the third Tuesday of each 
month. During the past year, ten such monthly meetings were held.
Major items considered by the Board and commented on in 
detail in subsequent sections of this report are (1) the peer 
review program, (2) the procedures for investigation of alleged or 
possible audit failures, (3) a study of the auditor's work 
environment, (4) the scope of services provided by CPA firms, and 
(5) membership in the Section.
At each meeting, the Board receives a report from its 
Executive Director on the recent activities of the Peer Review 
Committee and the Executive Committee. A Board staff member 
attends all meetings of these committees as well as meetings of 
several of their subcommittees and task forces.
In addition, Board members and staff met on several occa­
sions with certain of the commissioners and staff of the Securities 
and Exchange Commission ("SEC"). The Board also submitted briefs
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and comments to the SEC on matters relating to scope of services by 
CPA firms. Board Vice-Chairman Garrett offered testimony at the 
August 1-2, 1979, hearing conducted by the Senate Subcommittee on 
Governmental Efficiency and the District of Columbia.
B. Composition of the Board
John J. McCloy continued as Chairman and Ray Garrett, Jr. 
continued as Vice-Chairman of the Board until his untimely death on 
February 3, 1980. John D. Harper and Arthur M. Wood whose initial 
terms expired on December 31, 1979 were elected for additional
three-year terms. Additional details are shown in Exhibit I of 
this report.
Annual Board remuneration continued at $30,000 per 
member, $40,000 for the Vice-Chairman and $50,000 for the Chairman.
In connection with work of the Board, each member is 
authorized to recruit staff assistance available in his office.
Mr. McCloy designated Mr. Richard A. Stark, a partner in the New 
York law firm of Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy, as counsel for
this purpose. Mr. Stark is also Secretary for the Board. Mr.
Charles R. Manzoni, Jr., a partner in the Chicago law firm of 
Gardner, Carton & Douglas, served as counsel to Mr. Garrett.
C. Staff and Expenses
The Board employs full-time executive and technical 
directors. Louis W. Matusiak has served as the Executive Director 
since May 1, 1978. Stuart Newman served as Technical Director from 
February 1, 1979, until his untimely death in December. On
February 1, 1980, Charles J. Evers joined the staff as Technical 
Director. Immediately prior to joining the POB staff, Mr. Evers 
served for over two years as a member of the senior staff of the 
Financial Accounting Standards Board. He has extensive public 
accounting experience, including six years as an audit partner with 
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. Because the number of peer reviews 
scheduled for 1980 exceeds 200, the Board at its March 1980 meeting 
authorized the addition of another full-time member to its 
technical staff.
All expenses of the Board and its staff are paid from 
membership dues of the Section. For accounting convenience, the 
Board reports its expenses on the same fiscal year basis used by the 
AICPA. The estimated expenses for the fiscal year ending July 31, 
1980, are $652,000. Additional details are shown in Exhibit II.
II. PEER REVIEW PROGRAM
A major responsibility of the Board is to monitor and 
evaluate the activities of the Peer Review Committee ("Committee"), 
the peer reviews of member firms, and the actions taken by the 
Section with respect to peer reviews.
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A. Peer Review Committee
The peer review program is administered by the Committee 
which consists of fifteen individuals appointed from member firms 
by the Executive Committee. Since its inception, the Committee has 
been under the leadership of Donald L. Neebes, a partner in Ernst & 
Whinney, whose term expires in 1980. The Executive Committee has 
appointed Joseph X. Loftus, a partner in Price Waterhouse & Co., as 
Vice-Chairman, and he will succeed Mr. Neebes as Chairman in 
October 1980.
Committee members' time commitments have been consid­
erable. The Committee held 10 meetings during the past year for a 
total of 19 days. In addition, Committee members are involved in 
subcommittee and task force meetings, oversight of specific peer 
reviews, and a number of special projects.
As noted in its 1978-79 Annual Report, the Board is aware 
that concerns have been expressed about a dominant representation 
of the larger firms on the Committee. Appointments to the Com­
mittee have been declined by several members of smaller firms, 
primarily because of the significant time commitment required. The 
Board is mindful of the need for Committee members to be a represen­
tative cross-section of larger and smaller firms and for the 
Committee to give appropriate consideration to the nature of 
practice of smaller firms in decisions that affect such firms. To 
date, the Board believes that the Executive and Peer Review 
Committees have given appropriate consideration to the nature of 
practice in a smaller firm.
1. Administration of Peer Reviews
In the interest of increasing the number of firms partic­
ipating in the Section's program, the Committee has authorized the 
Private Companies Practice Section Peer Review Committee ("PCPS- 
PRC") and associations of CPA firms to administer certain aspects 
of the peer review program in compliance with the Committee's 
standards. However, the Committee has the sole responsibility for 
accepting and placing in the public file reports and letters of 
comments for all member firms of the Section. Further, the 
Committee Chairman may reject the review team or Quality Control 
Review Panel ("Panel") appointments of the PCPS-PRC.
For association-administered reviews, the Committee must 
approve each association's administrative plan and assigns a Panel 
for each such review. If an association has a common quality 
control element, that particular element must be reviewed by a team 
or firm that is independent of the association.
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a . Summary of 1978 and 1979 Reviews
Fifty-one member firms have had their initial peer review 
under the Section's program: 11 1/ in 1978 and 40 in 1979. The 
firms reviewed vary widely in size, ranging from sole proprietor­
ships to national firms. An indication of size of the firms 
reviewed and the extent of coverage of SEC clients is as follows:
Size of Firm
(by number of SEC Clients)
_____ Number of______
Firms SEC Clients
None 
1 to 4 
5 to 29 
30 or more
32 0
8 12
4 48
7 5,177
51 5,237
Total number of SEC clients
audited by member firms 8,880
Percentage of SEC clients 
audited by member firms 
which had a review in
1978 or 1979 59%
Of the 40 peer reviews conducted in 1979, 34 were conducted 
by committee-appointed review teams, 5 by another member firm, and 
one by an association.
The Standards for Performing and Reporting on Quality 
Control Compliance Reviews provide that the review team ordinarily 
furnish the reviewed firm with a letter of comments, which is 
placed along with the report in the public files, informing the 
reviewed firm of matters that the review team believes may require 
action. The Committee continued its practice of considering each 
report issued on a peer review together with the related letter of 
comments and the reviewed firm's response to determine whether 
further action was required, including whether it should recommend 
the imposition of sanctions to the Executive Committee.
1/ Includes a firm that had a voluntary review and a subsequent 
review conducted under the auspices of the SEC. The Committee 
accepted these reviews as meeting the peer review membership 
requirement of the Section.
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As of the date of this report, the Committee has 
considered and accepted the report, letter of comments, if issued, 
and the related response on only 21 of the forty 1979 reviews. The 
Committee has not been able to take action on the remaining 19 
reviews because the report, letter, response, or reviewers' 
workpapers have not all been submitted to the Committee for action.
The 21 accepted reports consist of 18 unqualified 
reports, 2 modified reports and 1 adverse report. One report was 
modified because the reviewed firm did not comply with the minimum 
professional liability insurance required by member firms. The 
second modified report cited lack of compliance with the minimum 
professional liability insurance as well as documentation 
deficiencies in a few functional areas of the firm's quality 
control system. The adverse report was due to the reviewed firm's 
general failure to comply with its stated system of quality control 
as applied to its accounting and auditing practice.
After placing the adverse report and attendant letter of 
comments and response in the public file, the Committee conferred 
with the reviewed firm (a sole practitioner) and suggested a 
remedial course of action. Three months later, in March 1980, the 
Committee reviewed the progress made by the firm in correcting the 
deficiencies noted and will recommend to the Executive Committee 
that this firm be continued as a member but require the firm to 
undergo another peer review in 1980. The firm has shown serious 
intent to improve its practice and has indicated its willingness to 
have its quality control system reviewed again in 1980.
There are preliminary indications that approximately 
seven additional reports, on the 19 reviews not yet processed by 
the Committee, will be modified.
The results of peer reviews are discussed at meetings 
with the Chairmen of the AICPA Quality Control Standards Committee, 
Auditing Standards Board, Accounting and Review Services Committee 
and the PCPS-PRC. Through these discussions, information gathered 
through the peer review process can be considered by these 
committees for possible new pronouncements to improve practice.
b. Reviews Scheduled for 1980 and 1981
Since membership in the Section commenced in 1978 and 
membership requirements call for a peer review once every three 
years, no member firm was required to have a peer review prior to 
1980. However, during the year, the Section encouraged firms to 
undergo their initial peer review in 1979 rather than in 1980. The 
results were disappointing to the Section and to the Board, 
especially since 70 of 110 member firms which had tentatively 
selected 1979 as the year of their initial review postponed their 
initial review to 1980.
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Confronted with the probability of having to administer 
approximately 520 reviews in 1980 (and every three years 
thereafter), the Executive Committee decided to permit certain 
firms with fewer than five SEC clients to defer their initial 
review until 1981. Consequently, approximately 200 of the 520 
firms have been assigned to have their initial reviews in 1980. The 
remainder, only ten percent of which had any SEC clients, have been 
allowed to defer their initial reviews to 1981.
Approximately 60 firms that joined the Section in 1978, 
and which were to have their initial peer reviews in 1980, 
requested the Committee to grant them extensions until 1981. The 
Committee granted seven of the requests and concluded that the 
remainder failed to establish existence of a significant 
unavoidable hardship. The Committee, together with the Executive 
Committee, considered the effect such rejections might have on 
membership in the Section and concluded that, in general, two years 
was sufficient time for a firm to prepare for its initial review.
c. Mergers and Acquisitions
The Organization Document2/ provides that member firms 
are required to have a peer review conducted every three years "or 
at such additional times as designated by the executive committee."
The Peer Review Committee, which is charged with the 
administration of peer reviews, studied the question of whether a 
merger of accounting firms should trigger a special peer review or 
accelerate the timing of the next scheduled review. The special 
review would involve a review of the segments of the member firm's 
practice acquired (merged) subsequent to its most recent review and 
which had not been previously subjected to peer review.
The Peer Review Committee recommended, and the Executive 
Committee adopted the recommendation, that no action was necessary 
in such circumstances. The primary reasons for the recommendation 
are (1) current quality controls literature requires a firm to give 
special attention to matters involved in mergers and acquisitions, 
(2) a reasonable amount of time should be allowed to the firm to 
assimilate the merged practice, and (3) the benefits of a special 
peer review could not be cost justified in view of the short time 
interval between the special review and the next regularly 
scheduled peer review.
The first peer review of the combined firm is to be no 
later than three years after the peer review of the predecessor 
firm which had the larger accounting and auditing practice.
2/ The document which sets forth the structure and functions of 
the SEC Practice Section is entitled "Organizational Structure 
and Functions of the SEC Practice Section of the AICPA Division 
for CPA Firms" ("Organization Document").
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The Executive Committee believes that effects of mergers 
should be reported and accordingly amended the Section's annual 
reporting requirements to include (1) the number of offices and the 
number of accounting and auditing personnel of the acquired firm 
and (2) the number of SEC clients of the acquired firm that will be 
(a) serviced by practice units which were combined with practice 
units of the acquiring firm or (b) continued as separate practice 
units in the combined firm.
The Board generally concurs with the position of the Peer 
Review and Executive Committees in this regard.
2. Other Significant Activities
Since the Board's last annual report, the Committee 
clarified and improved the standards and guidelines for performing 
and reporting on peer reviews. The Committee also made progress in 
resolving the difficult issues (1) of extending the peer review 
process to include engagements performed outside the United States 
and (2) of access by the SEC to reviewers' workpapers.
a. Changes in Standards and Guidelines
The Committee issued additional guidelines for selection 
of audit engagements to be reviewed and for testing compliance with 
the Section's revised membership requirements regarding management 
advisory services ("MAS"). These requirements were added during 
the year as recommended in the Board's report entitled Scope of 
Services by CPA Firms ("MAS Report").
b . Review of Audit Work Performed Outside the 
United States
As the SEC pointed out in its 1978 Report to Congress3/ 
and its 1979 Report to Congress,4/ it might take considerable time 
to resolve the question of subjecting audit work performed outside 
the United States to the peer review process. The Board observed in
3/ Securities and Exchange Commission Report to Congress on the 
Accounting Profession and the Commission's Oversight Role, 
prepared for the Subcommittee on Governmental Efficiency and 
the District of Columbia of the Senate Committee on
Governmental Affairs, 95th Cong., 2nd Sess., 27-28 (Comm. 
Print. 1978) ("SEC 1978 Report to Congress").
4/ Securities and Exchange Commission Report to Congress on the 
Accounting Profession and the Commission's Oversight Role, 
prepared for the Subcommittee on Governmental Efficiency and 
the District of Columbia of the Senate Committee on
Governmental Affairs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 36 (Comm. Print. 
1979) ("SEC 1979 Report to Congress").
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its 1978-79 Annual Report that professional bodies and firms in the 
United States have significant limitations on their authority to 
impose review requirements on accounting firms in other countries; 
indeed, such "intrusion" is often resented and must be handled with 
discretion.
During 1979, the Committee studied this matter in depth. 
Meetings were held with representatives of the profession in 
Australia, Canada, France, The Netherlands, West Germany, and the 
United Kingdom. In addition, representatives of the Committee met 
with representatives of the International Auditing Practices 
Committee ("IAPC") of the International Federation of Accountants, 
which was considering publication of an international auditing 
guideline dealing with reliance on other auditors. The Board has 
been informed that IAPC has decided to publish on June 1, 1980, an 
exposure draft on the subject.
The Committee adopted in principle an approach for review 
of work done outside the U.S. which the Committee believes will be 
supported by the professions in other countries and which is 
consistent with existing U.S. auditing standards and with the 
proposed international standard. The Committee has also agreed to 
adopt a similar approach for review of work done by domestic 
affiliates. The approach focuses on the supervision and control of 
segments of engagements performed by domestic or foreign affiliates 
or correspondents. To enable peer reviewers to test compliance, a 
firm will be required to document several specified matters 
relating to supervision and control. The Committee reports that it 
plans to amend its standards accordingly, effective for audit 
engagements beginning after June 30, 1980.
The Board supports the Committee's actions in this 
respect and concludes that the Committee's approach achieves all 
that can be done at this time, and appreciates the assistance of 
IAPC in helping resolve this difficult problem.
B . Board Monitoring of 1979 Reviews
Board representatives monitoring a specific review are 
required to assess the appropriateness of the conduct of the review 
and the reports issued and to challenge those that are not done in 
accordance with standards. They also review the propriety of 
reviews terminated prior to completion.
1. Types of Monitoring Programs
The Board used three different programs in monitoring 
1979 peer reviews: a visitation-observation program, a workpaper- 
review program, and a report-review program.
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The visitation-observation program consists of an exami­
nation of workpapers and reports prepared by reviewers and of 
visits to one or more offices of the reviewed firm during the 
performance of the review, with emphasis on attendance at the exit 
conference between reviewers and reviewed firm personnel. These 
visits are made by Board staff members with selective attendance by 
Board members as well. The workpaper-review program consists of an 
examination of workpapers, report and letter prepared by the 
reviewers and the reviewed firm's response. The report-review 
program consists of a reading of the report, letter of comments, 
and the reviewed firm's response.
2. Selection of Reviews To Be Monitored
The Board adopted the following plan for selecting the 
work programs to be used in monitoring peer reviews:
• Firms with 5 or more SEC clients— all 
reviews are monitored using the visitation- 
observation program.
• Firms with 1 to 4 SEC clients— 20% of the 
reviews are monitored using the visitation- 
observation program, 50% using the 
workpaper-review program, and the remaining 
30% using the report-review program.
• Firms with no SEC clients— 10% of the 
reviews are monitored using the visitation- 
observation program, 20% using the 
workpaper-review program, and the remaining 
70% using the report-review program.
The selections in the latter two groups are made at 
random. The Board's staff also examines the reviewers' workpapers 
on any firm receiving a modified report arising from a deficiency 
in its quality control system.
Because the number of reviews in 1979 was substantially 
fewer than anticipated, the above percentages were exceeded. The 
majority of the reviews were subjected to the workpaper-review 
monitoring program.
3. Excluded Engagements
The SEC 1979 Report to Congress (pages 134-135) repeated 
the SEC's concern regarding the right of the reviewed firm to 
exclude certain engagements from the scope of the review. Only 2 of 
the 40 firms reviewed in 1979 had requested a total of three engage­
ments be excluded. Two non-public clients, one from each of the two 
reviewed firms, requested that workpapers on their audit 
engagements not be subjected to peer review. The third engagement 
was excluded because of potential litigation involving the reviewed 
firm and a former client.
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In monitoring 1979 reviews, the Board determined the 
engagements which were excluded, and satisfied itself that each 
reason for exclusion was appropriate and that the exclusion did not 
adversely affect the scope of the review.
4. Supplemental Staff of the Board
As in the prior year, the Board employed three CPA firm 
retired partners on a part-time basis to monitor 1979 reviews, most 
of which are performed in the summer and fall months. Each of these 
persons, John W. Nicholson (formerly of Arthur Young & Company), R. 
Kirk Batzer (formerly of Coopers & Lybrand) and Harry F. Reiss, Jr. 
(formerly of Ernst & Whinney), has extensive experience in quality 
control systems of accounting and auditing practices. No member of 
either the full-time or part-time staff is assigned to monitor a 
review if the member was formerly associated with either the 
reviewing or reviewed firm.
5. Matters Raised by Staff on Specific Reviews
In two 1979 reviews, the Board's staff questioned whether 
the review had been conducted according to prescribed standards. 
Based upon the reviewers' workpapers, the Board's staff concluded 
that the engagements reviewed did not represent a cross-section of 
that firm's practice, and that a letter of comments should have 
been issued in one review on the basis that there was insufficient 
documentation of key areas in certain audit engagements. As a 
result, the Committee caused the reviewers to review additional 
engagements (expand the scope of the review) and assigned a 
committee member to consult with the reviewers as to the 
appropriateness of a letter of comments.
In its 1978-79 Annual Report, the Board reported that its 
staff questioned whether reporting standards were appropriately 
applied in one 1978 review and indicated that the Committee was 
reviewing two cases where reviews were commenced but discontinued 
prior to completion. These matters were resolved to the 
satisfaction of the Board's staff and the Board during the past 
year.
6. Review of Workpapers by the SEC
The workpapers prepared by the Board's staff in 
monitoring specific peer reviews in 1978 and 1979 have been made 
available to, and have been examined by, the staff of the Chief 
Accountant of the SEC. These workpapers will continue to be 
accessible by members of the staff of the Chief Accountant. 
Notwithstanding this access to the Board's workpapers, the SEC 1979 
Report to Congress (pages 33-34) expressed concern as to whether 
the SEC would have sufficient access to the peer review process to 
make an objective evaluation of its adequacy.
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In response to this concern, the Committee proposed a 
procedure under which the SEC staff would be given access to 
certain workpapers of reviewers; workpapers on review of individual 
audit engagements, because they contain confidential client data, 
would not be made available. The Board is hopeful that the 
combination of SEC access to all of the Board's peer review 
workpapers and those workpapers available under the Committee's 
recent proposal will satisfy the SEC's concerns regarding its 
ability to properly evaluate the peer review process.
The staff of the Chief Accountant of the SEC suggested 
ways in which the staff of the Board can improve documentation of 
the basis for its satisfaction that the reviewers fully considered 
and reported properly on the effects of the deficiencies noted in 
their workpapers. The Board's staff developed and discussed with 
the staff of the SEC a proposed work program which would require 
such additional documentation and the basis for its conclusions. 
These additional documentation requirements will be applied in 
monitoring future reviews.
C. Board Conclusions on the Peer Review Program
1980 will be a key year for the peer review program. The 
Board believes the review program developed by the Committee, the 
monitoring program developed by the Board and the arrangements for 
SEC access to workpapers of the Board and certain papers of the 
reviewers will be severly tested in 1980. While the Board 
anticipates that 1980 experiences may afford opportunities for 
further improvements, it believes that the programs thus far 
developed are well conceived and should benefit the member firms 
and the profession and afford further assurances to the public.
III. PROCEDURES WITH RESPECT TO AUDIT FAILURES
As noted in the Board's 1978-79 Annual Report, one of the 
first matters identified by the Executive Committee for 
consultation with the Board related to the investigative and 
disciplinary action that should be taken by the Section with 
respect to an alleged or possible audit failure involving a member 
firm. An important question arose as to whether disciplinary or 
other proceedings by the Section should be deferred during the 
pendency of litigation or investigation and threatened enforcement 
action by the SEC or other governmental agencies.
A. Board Recommendations
After extended study, the Board concluded that protection 
of users of audited financial statements should be the dominant 
consideration in any action taken by the Section with respect to a 
possible audit failure. The Board recommended that a permanent 
committee be established to monitor, and to determine what action,
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if any, should be taken with respect to alleged or possible audit 
failures involving member firms. The principal purposes of the 
committee and its monitoring effort would be to determine whether 
facts relating to an audit failure indicate that auditing standards 
are inadequate or that the quality controls of the member firm need 
strengthening. In developing these primary purposes, the Board 
concluded that disciplinary proceedings directed toward the 
punishment of a member firm were of less immediate importance, 
particularly in view of the fact that the firm and individuals 
involved in an audit failure would likely be facing punitive and 
compensatory actions by governmental and regulatory bodies and by 
private litigants. Nonetheless, the Board recommended that the 
Section have the authority to institute formal disciplinary
proceedings in those circumstances where such action is deemed 
appropriate, notwithstanding the pendency of litigation or 
governmental action.
B . Procedures Adopted by Executive Committee
On November 29, 1979, after extensive discussion and
further consultation with the Board, the Executive Committee
adopted a resolution set forth as Appendix B to the Organization 
Document authorizing the establishment of a Special Investigations 
Committee ("SIC") and adopted a document entitled The Special 
Investigations Committee of the SEC Practice Section of the AICPA 
Division for CPA Firms ("SIC Document") setting forth the
procedures to govern the operations of the SIC. At the same time 
the Executive Committee adopted a separate document entitled Rules 
of Procedure for the Imposition of Sanctions ("Procedure Document") 
which sets forth procedures established by the Executive Committee 
applicable to all proceedings relating to the imposition of 
sanctions by the Section, i.e., proceedings by the Peer Review
Committee, the SIC and the Executive Committee.
Copies of the Organization Document, the SIC Document and 
the Procedure Document are annexed as Exhibits III, V and VI to this 
report. Principal features of the Section's investigative and 
disciplinary mechanism established by these documents are 
summarized below, together with certain comments of the Board.
C . The Special Investigations Committee
The SIC is appointed by the Executive Committee and is 
composed of nine members who are partners or retired partners of 
different member firms. SIC members serve three-year staggered 
terms and are eligible to serve two such terms in addition to 
partial terms. Procedures are established to avoid conflict of 
interest situations. The SIC should have whatever staff it needs 
to perform its duties. Initial members of the SIC, appointed in 
December 1979, are shown in Exhibit VII.
12
The SIC Document requires member firms to report to the 
SIC, within 30 days of service on them of the first pleading in the 
matter, or within 30 days after joining the Section if later, any 
litigation (including criminal indictments) against them or their 
personnel, or any proceeding or investigation publicly announced by 
a regulatory agency, commenced on or after November 1, 1979 (not
including additional proceedings arising out of or related to facts 
involved in litigation originally filed prior to November 1, 1979), 
that involves clients or former clients that are SEC registrants 
and that allege deficiencies in the conduct of an audit or in 
reporting thereon in connection with any required filing under the 
federal securities laws. The SIC will screen information thus 
reported and information from other sources relating to cases not 
involving litigation commenced on or before November 1, 1979.
The Board initially questioned the November 1, 1979
cutoff date as being too restrictive with the result that the 
Section would be powerless to deal with significant audit failures 
involving litigation commenced prior to November 1, 1979. After an 
extended conference with members of the Executive Committee, 
however, the Board concluded that the cutoff date was justified by 
practical considerations. Moreover, in response to the Board's 
concern, the Executive Committee, when it adopted the SIC Document 
and the Procedure Document, also agreed to refer to the SIC on an ad 
hoc basis any "case" (as defined below) that arose before November 
1, 1979, and thus falls outside the SIC's jurisdiction, but which 
requires prompt attention because events subsequent to November 1, 
1979, indicate the matter has great potential significance to the 
public and the profession.
On the basis of information screened by the SIC, it may 
(1) monitor further developments without an investigation, (2) 
investigate the firm (without investigating the "case," i.e., the 
specific alleged failure), to review certain of the firm's quality 
control policies and procedures or to review other engagements by 
the personnel involved in the case or of other engagements in the 
same industry as the case, or (3) recommend investigation of the 
case to the Executive Committee. The scope of an investigation of 
a firm will be established by the SIC, while the scope of an 
investigation of a case will be established by the Executive 
Committee. The SIC Document states that the purpose of any such 
investigation will be to determine whether
1. Quality controls are inadequate in a particular 
firm, or
2. There has been a material departure from generally 
accepted auditing standards or a material failure to 
comply with quality control standards by the 
individuals responsible for the engagement in 
question, or
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3. There is a need for reconsidering the adequacy of 
certain generally accepted auditing standards or 
quality controls standards.
The SIC Document contemplates that an investigation of a 
case (but not of a firm) will not ordinarily be recommended by the 
SIC if the case is the subject of a court proceeding or a proceeding 
or investigation by the SEC, a grand jury, or other governmental 
body until such matters are concluded. Nevertheless, the SIC may 
decide that a particular case is of such significance to the public 
interest that the importance of immediately investigating it 
outweighs any possible prejudice to the firm.
A member firm is required to cooperate in furnishing 
information to the SIC and in any SIC-initiated investigation of a 
firm or case unless the firm can demonstrate to the satisfaction of 
the SIC (a) that there is a likelihood that the firm's rights in 
pending litigation or other proceeding or investigation will be 
unduly prejudiced by the firm's providing the requested information 
and (b) that the need for such information is not sufficient to 
override the interest of the firm or individuals in avoiding 
prejudice in such litigation or other proceeding or investigation. 
If a member firm fails to supply information to the SIC as required, 
such failure will be a basis for the SIC to recommend to the 
Executive Committee that sanctions be imposed on the firm.
D. Sanctioning Hearings
At the conclusion of an investigation of a firm or a 
case, the SIC may conduct a hearing to determine whether to 
recommend sanctions to the Executive Committee. (Sanctions may 
also be recommended after a hearing by the Peer Review Committee as 
a result of a regular peer review.) Sanctions that may be recom­
mended and imposed include the following:
1. Requirements for corrective measures not volun­
tarily taken by the firm.
2. Additional requirements for continuing professional 
education.
3. Special or accelerated peer review.
4. Admonishment, censure or reprimand.
5. Monetary fine.
6. Suspension from membership in the Section.
7. Expulsion from membership in the Section.
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Sanctions may be imposed only by the Executive Committee 
after a hearing governed by the procedures set forth in the 
Procedure Document. This document deals with the authority for and 
nature of the hearings, the rights of the parties, and procedural 
rules intended to provide for an orderly proceeding leading to a 
fair result while adequately safeguarding the rights of member 
firms and individuals.
Hearings are not open to the public and all matters 
relating thereto are confidential until a decision is made by the 
Executive Committee to impose sanctions. Then the Executive 
Committee will decide upon publishing in a membership periodical of 
the AICPA the notice of the case and the decision to be published, 
together with the name of the member firm. Documents setting forth 
sanctions imposed on a member firm will be placed in the Section's 
public file.
E. Board Oversight
The Organization Document provides that the Board shall 
monitor and evaluate the regulatory and sanction activities of the 
Peer Review Committee and Executive Committee, which includes the 
SIC. The Procedure Document provides that the Board or its repre­
sentative may have access to all briefs, memoranda, documentary 
evidence, and stenographic transcripts of the hearing. The Board 
is required to maintain confidentiality with respect to all such 
information. Nevertheless, after giving the firm concerned an 
opportunity to present its views and after consultation with the 
Executive Committee, the Board may make public disclosure of 
information thus obtained which it deems necessary in the interest 
of the profession or the public.
F. The Board's Appraisal
The Board has consulted with the Executive Committee on 
all important aspects of the procedures outlined above and has 
concluded that the procedures embody a reasonable framework for 
self-policing and disciplinary measures to protect the public and 
the profession. Because the accounting profession has been the 
subject of substantial litigation in recent years, it should be 
recognized that the task of preparing the SIC Document and the 
Procedure Document involved issues of extreme importance to the 
profession. The Board believes that, all things considered, a 
balanced and practical result has been achieved. Because the 
procedures developed provide broad discretion to members of the 
profession, the Board believes that the success or failure of the 
overall program can only be judged by results which may require 
several years of experience.
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The Board regards effective implementation of the 
Section's investigative and monitoring procedures to be essential 
features of the Section's self-regulatory program and intends to 
give particular attention to monitoring such procedures and to 
offer comments from time to time as appropriate.
IV. Study of the Auditor's Work Environment
A. Recommendation of Cohen Commission
After studying the audit environment as it existed prior 
to June 1977, the Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities ("Cohen 
Commission") issued a report5/ stating that its research indicated 
that substandard auditing was frequently caused by time and budget 
pressures placed on auditors. That research consisted of a survey 
conducted by John G. Rhode for the Cohen Commission6/ which also 
stated that inadequate supervision on audits resulted in auditors 
having signed for completing audit steps which were not in fact 
performed.
Rhode based his conclusions on replies to a questionnaire 
sent to present and former partners and staff members of auditing 
firms. While the Cohen Commission's analysis of legal cases did 
not identify instances where unreasonable time budgets caused an 
audit failure, the commission concluded that time pressure created 
significant problems. The lack of a proven relationship between 
unreasonable time budgets and problem cases, in part, led the 
commission to recommend that "individual public accounting firms 
immediately undertake to conduct studies to determine the extent of 
conditions revealed by the commission's study and the effects on 
their practices" of pressures induced by time budgets (page 118).
B. Action Taken by the Section
At the suggestion of the Board, a task force on Certain 
Aspects of the Auditor's Work Environment ("Task Force") was formed 
by the Section's Executive Committee to consider what actions the 
Section should take relative to the conclusions of the Rhode study.
5/ The Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities: Report,
Conclusions, and Recommendations (New York: AICPA, 1978).
6/ John Grant Rhode, The Independent Auditor's Work Environment: 
A Survey. The Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities No. 4. 
(New York: AICPA, 1978).
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After considerable discussion and study, the Task Force 
presented its conclusions and recommendations in a position paper 
entitled Certain Aspects of the Auditor's Work Environment, which 
is reproduced as Appendix VIII of this report. The position paper 
was accepted by the Executive Committee and copies were distributed 
to all member firms of the Section.
The Task Force position paper states that "serious 
consideration must be given to any indications that some audits may 
be performed at a substandard level, that excessive time and budget 
pressures may be the cause of substandard audits, and that 
inadequate supervision and improper sign-off practices may result 
from those pressures" and recommends that "firms take steps to 
mitigate the possible effect of such conditions" (page 5).
In view of significant developments in the profession 
since publication of the Cohen Commission report, the Task Force 
does not believe that a pervasive condition of substandard audits 
exists as a result of audit procedures omitted because of excessive 
time pressures. Nevertheless, the Task Force recommended that 
firms (1) take steps to assure effective communication to staff of 
the objectives of time budgeting, (2) plan for and maintain 
adequate numbers of supervisory staff, and (3) provide personnel 
additional guidance, if needed, regarding the form and content of 
working papers, the proper procedures for signing off for work 
performed and for noting a change in planned procedures. These 
three recommendations are consistent with recent profession-wide 
developments, namely, issuance of Statement on Auditing Standards 
No. 22, Planning and Supervision, actions by the AICPA Division for 
CPA Firms (especially the mandatory triennial peer reviews for 
members of the Section), measures taken by the AICPA to discipline 
individual member CPAs, and the issuance of Statement on Quality 
Control Standards No. 1, System of Quality Control for a CPA Firm.
While some firms may choose to conduct an internal survey 
of partners and staff members concerning the auditor's work 
environment, the Task Force considers such survey unnecessary and 
concludes that the three procedures referred to above effectively 
address the Cohen Commission's concerns.
C . The Board's Appraisal
The Task Force position paper is a careful analysis of 
the problems cited in the Cohen Commission report. The problems 
must be solved in the first instance by individual public 
accounting firms. The profession's recent emphasis on the 
supervision and control aspects of the conduct of an audit will 
help eliminate the problems. Finally, the peer review process, 
which evaluates the reviewed firm's planning, supervision and 
control policies and procedures and compliance therewith, should 
also reduce the frequency of such deficiencies.
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The Board accepts the judgment that failure to perform 
audit procedures because of constraints imposed by time budgets is 
not a pervasive problem. Yet the Board believes that some firms may 
have, in varying degrees, deficiencies attributable to time budget 
pressures on auditors. Accordingly, the Board endorses the 
recommendations made by the Task Force (and adopted by the 
Executive Committee) which essentially call for increased emphasis 
on supervision and control of audits, preparation of realistic time 
budgets and for raising the level of consciousness of staff members 
regarding the objectives of time budgeting and the appropriate 
manner for noting a change in a planned procedure or a decision not 
to carry out the procedure.
V. SCOPE OF SERVICES BY CPA FIRMS
In March 1979, the Board published its report, Scope of 
Services by CPA Firms ("MAS Report"). A summary of the conclusions 
and recommendations of the MAS Report was included in the Board's 
1978-79 Annual Report. Since the publication of the annual report, 
various interested parties have responded to the conclusions and 
recommendations contained in the MAS Report.
A. Reactions to MAS Report
1. Executive Committee of the Section
Several of the Board's recommendations called for 
affirmative action by the Executive Committee. In this regard, the 
Board generally recommended the following: (1) any rules relating 
to management advisory services ("MAS") engagements should be based 
on maintaining the independence and objectivity of the auditor in 
the course of his conduct of an audit; (2) compliance with the 
existing standards relating to MAS and independence contained in 
the AICPA Professional Standards on Management Advisory Services 
and in the AICPA Code of Professional Ethics should be made a 
condition of membership in the Section; (3) the peer review process 
should be expanded to require review of MAS engagements for SEC 
audit clients to test for compliance with independence standards 
enunciated by the AICPA; (4) member firms should be required to 
disclose in their annual statements filed with the Section the 
amount of fees received from audit clients for MAS and tax services 
performed, expressed as a percentage of aggregate fees received 
during the reporting period; and (5) members of the Section should 
be prohibited from performing exclusive or primary actuarial 
services for insurance company audit clients.
On June 21, 1979, the Executive Committee adopted several 
revisions of the Organization Document, many of which were in 
response to the recommendations in the MAS Report. That document 
was revised to require member firms to adhere to the AICPA 
Professional Standards on Management Advisory Services and the 
AICPA Code of Professional Ethics with respect to independence in 
performing MAS for audit clients that are SEC registrants. 
Pursuant to that revision, members are prohibited from serving as
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an actuary for an insurance company audit client with respect to 
policy reserves and related accounts unless the primary actuarial 
assistance to management comes from actuaries not related to the 
auditing firm. Actuarial assistance in other areas is permissible, 
subject to the requirements that the service remain advisory.
Consistent with the recommendations in the MAS Report, 
members continue to be prohibited from furnishing certain executive 
recruiting services to SEC audit clients and from providing merger 
and acquisition assistance to such clients for a finder's fee. In 
addition, the Executive Committee continued the prohibition on 
providing such clients psychological testing services and public 
opinion polling services.
The Executive Committee took action in two additional 
areas in direct response to the Board's recommendation. The 
committee instructed its Peer Review Committee to incorporate into 
the peer review process a review of MAS engagements for audit 
clients to test for compliance with the independence standards. In 
addition, annual statements of members which are placed in the 
public file at the AICPA must now reveal gross fees for MAS and tax 
services performed for SEC registrant audit clients, expressed as a 
percentage of total fees charged to such clients.
As reflected in the foregoing discussion, the Executive 
Committee implemented all of the Board's recommendations, albeit 
not in all instances in precisely the form suggested. Nonetheless, 
the Board is satisfied with the action taken by the Executive 
Committee.
One of the possible deviations from the Board's recommen­
dations exists in the continued proscription of psychological 
testing and public opinion polling. Any general proscription of 
these services would seem to be predicated on concerns for 
maintaining professional image and not on independence. While in 
its MAS Report the Board recommended against proscribing specific 
services on the basis of image impairment, it made that 
recommendation because of the difficulty of making such 
determinations in any fair and comprehensive way and because it 
believed that proxy statement disclosure regarding MAS, then 
recently imposed on SEC registrants, should be given a chance to 
work. At the same time, the Board expressed serious concern with 
unfettered proliferation of MAS and urged members to exercise self- 
restraint in expanding into new areas of MAS.
In light of the Board's concern over the potential 
impairment of professional image, it did not object to the 
Executive Committee's decision to retain the proscription with 
respect to psychological testing and opinion polling. In fact, 
recent publicly announced actions and advertisements by some large 
accounting firms suggest that they may have misinterpreted the 
Board's decision not to recommend the proscription of specific 
services which may impair professional image. The Board will
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continue to monitor this aspect of the accounting profession, 
including formal disclosures contained in proxy statements of SEC 
registrants and in annual statements filed by members with the 
Section. It is the hope of the Board that the new disclosure 
provisions and, above all, an inclination toward self-restraint 
will operate to preserve and enhance the accountant's image, which, 
in itself, is a confidence-building factor in the public attitude 
toward auditors.
2. Securities and Exchange Commission
On June 14, 1979, the Securities and Exchange Commission 
published Accounting Series Release 264 ("ASR 264") which contains 
the Commission's views of the issues raised by MAS. While the 
Commission in ASR 264 endorsed several of the conclusions reached 
by the Board in its MAS Report, it stated that the MAS Report did 
"not adequately sensitize the profession and its clients to 
potential effects on the independence of accountants of performance 
of non-audit services for audit clients." A similar criticism was 
made in the SEC 1979 Report to Congress (page 81).
Since the Commission invited comments on ASR 264, the 
Board, in a letter to the SEC dated October 10, 1979, commented on 
certain aspects of ASR 264 with which it disagreed. Generally, the 
Board commented that ASR 264 (1) fails to recognize adequately the 
efforts of the AICPA over the years in addressing problems raised 
by MAS; (2) fails to give sufficient guidance as to whether 
adherence to the MAS standards for membership in the Section will 
be a sufficient defense against a charge that MAS impaired an 
auditor's independence? and (3) confuses notions of independence 
and professional image. The Board also commented that ASR 264 may 
discourage managements and boards of directors from retaining their 
auditors for MAS engagements in circumstances where it may very 
well be in the interest of shareholders to do so, and that it 
incorrectly concluded that the MAS Report recommended no 
proscriptive rules solely on the basis that there was an absence of 
empirical evidence showing that MAS impairs independence. Finally, 
the Board advised the SEC that ASR 264 unnecessarily and 
unfortunately casts a cloud over the performance of MAS related to 
internal controls at a time when the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act 
makes it essential for boards of directors and audit committees to 
seek assurances of their independent auditors with respect to 
internal control systems.
The Board believes that audit committees and boards of 
directors are qualified to make reviews and determinations as to 
the effect of MAS on independence of their auditors as called for by 
ASR 250. It regrets the confusion that seems to have resulted among 
audit committees and boards of directors from the issuance of ASR 
264.
20
On January 3, 1980, in a speech before the AICPA Seventh 
National Conference on Current SEC Developments, SEC Chairman 
Williams clarified and expanded upon certain aspects of ASR 264, 
stating that the Commission, in issuing ASR 264, did not intend to 
"deprecate the benefits that may accrue from certain MAS 
activities." He indicated that assisting clients in reviewing 
internal accounting control systems would typically be the type of 
service that would produce enough benefits to more than offset the 
danger that such assistance might impair the auditing firm's inde­
pendence. Chairman Williams also acknowledged that ASR 264 
inadvertently uses the terms "non-audit services" and "MAS" inter­
changeably, but recognized that MAS encompasses a narrower scope of 
activities and stated that the Commission did not intend to 
stigmatize firms that receive a substantial amount of their fees 
from tax work and so-called "accounting and review services."
With respect to whether a firm's dependence on MAS could 
affect its independence, Chairman Williams indicated that, even 
though ASR 264 suggested that an auditor's independence might be 
impaired by the magnitude of the ratio of the firm's non-audit fees 
to audit fees for a specific client or for the firm as a whole, the 
Commission did not mean to suggest that it would, after the fact, 
question an auditor's independence based solely on a percentage 
relationship. The Chairman did say that the profession cannot 
ignore the magnitude of MAS on a firm-wide basis since "undue 
emphasis on MAS could ultimately translate into an effect on the 
quality of audit work performed."
In its MAS Report (page 25), the Board expressed a 
similar concern by stating that a disproportionate amount of MAS 
performed on a firm-wide basis may result in a dilution or 
perceived dilution of the accounting firm's primary service which, 
in turn, may impair its professional image. Whether the threat is 
to the quality of audits, as suggested by Chairman Williams, or to 
the image of the profession, as suggested in the MAS Report, or 
both, is not important to decide now, but the profession should 
recognize the concern expressed by both the Commission and the 
Board and act to prevent any such impairment.
3. Other Comments
Under a letter dated May 24, 1979, the American Academy 
of Actuaries ("Academy"), furnished the Board a copy of its 
comments, prepared for the SEC's Chief Accountant, criticizing the 
analyses and conclusions in the MAS Report relating to actuarial 
services. The criticism alleged that the MAS Report contained 
certain inconsistencies and that the Board incorrectly interpreted
21
and applied Statement of Auditing Standards Number 11 ("SAS 11")7/. 
The Board relied on SAS 11 in its conclusion that performing both 
actuarial and audit services for a client did not pose a problem of 
self-review.
The Academy argued that the Board had incorrectly 
concluded that SAS 11 could be relied upon by an auditing firm in 
circumstances where an employee of the firm performed the 
specialized services to which SAS 11 refers, intending instead that 
SAS 11 may be applied only where the specialist has no relationship 
with the auditor.
The Board presented the Academy's position on SAS 11 to 
the AICPA and sought clarification of the question presented by the 
Academy's argument. The AICPA confirmed that the MAS Report 
properly interpreted the application of SAS 11 and that the 
position taken by the Academy was incorrect. In a letter to the 
SEC's Chief Accountant, dated August 9, 1979, the Board advised 
that it had reviewed the Academy's contentions regarding SAS 11 and 
other matters and that it wished to affirm the conclusions it had 
reached in the MAS Report on all points raised by the Academy. 
Copies of this correspondence are available from the Board's 
executive director.
Aside from the Academy's comment to the Commission, the 
Board received no other formal comments on the MAS Report. 
However, several persons in their written comments to the SEC on 
ASR 264 included reference to the MAS Report, in most instances 
criticizing the Commission for failing to give adequate recognition 
to the conclusions reached by the Board.
B. Monitoring MAS Disclosures
As indicated in the MAS Report (pages 46 and 56), proxy 
statement disclosures and peer reviews of MAS performed for audit 
clients will supply new data on the nature and extent of MAS 
furnished to audit clients who are SEC registrants. The Board 
intends to monitor this new source of information and comment if 
the facts suggest that the self-restraint urged by the Board is 
ignored by the profession or if the magnitude of MAS appears to 
increase to an extent that it threatens professional image 
generally.
7/ SAS 11, issued by the AICPA Auditing Standards Board, generally 
provides that an auditor obtain an understanding of the methods 
and assumptions used by a specialist and need not perform 
comprehensive audit procedures or challenge the specialist's 
methods or assumptions, unless his limited review procedures 
lead him to believe that the findings are unreasonable under 
the circumstances.
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VI. SEC PRACTICE SECTION
A. Changes in Executive Committee
The Section's Organization Document states that the 
Executive Committee shall be composed of representatives of at 
least twenty-one member firms. The document further provides that
The executive committee shall at all times 
include representatives of all member firms 
which audit the financial statements of thirty 
or more registrants under section 12 of the 
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 and at 
least five representatives of firms which audit 
financial statements of fewer than thirty such 
registrants plus one additional such represen­
tative for each representative, in excess of 
sixteen, of firms which audit thirty or more 
such registrants.
At the date of the Board's 1978-79 Annual Report, the 
Executive Committee consisted of representatives of sixteen firms 
that were entitled to representation on the committee because of 
the number of SEC audit clients and representatives of six other 
member firms. During the past year, because of mergers between 
four such firms, the number of representatives entitled to 
automatic representation was reduced to fourteen.
In June 1979, Walter E. Hanson of Peat, Marwick, Mitchell 
& Co. reported that he would not be available to serve as Chairman 
of the Executive Committee for 1979-80. At the August 7, 1979, 
meeting of the Executive Committee, Archibald E. MacKay of Main 
Hurdman & Cranstoun was elected to serve as Chairman for the 1979- 
80 committee year. The Chairman serves at the pleasure of the 
committee but in no event for more than three one-year terms.
The firms represented on the Executive Committee as of 
March 31, 1980, are shown in Exhibit IV of this report.
B. Changes in Membership Requirements
The number of firms auditing SEC clients that are not 
members of the Section is a matter of major importance that the 
Board has discussed with the Executive Committee on several 
occasions.
Since the Board's 1978-79 Annual Report, the Section has 
made changes in certain of its requirements to encourage more 
accounting firms that audit at least one SEC client to join the
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Section. The changes were made on the basis of information 
gathered by the Section's membership committee and staff and are 
summarized below:
1. Membership dues for firms that audit less than five 
SEC clients were limited to a maximum of $100 per 
year. (Firms with five or more SEC clients are 
assessed dues —  $15 per capita for 1980 —  based on 
the number of all professional staff with no upper 
limit.)
2. Insurance requirements for firms that audit less 
than five SEC clients were reduced to require such 
firms to maintain $50,000 of liability insurance 
coverage per qualified staff person, with a minimum 
of $250,000; maximum of $5,000,000. (Firms that 
audit five or more SEC clients are required to 
maintain a minimum of $2,000,000 of insurance; 
maximum of $10,000,000).
3. Billing rates for peer reviews of firms with less 
than 20 professionals were reduced to the rates used 
by the Private Companies Practice Section.
4. As noted in Section II of this report, steps were 
taken to permit PCPS-PRC participation in the 
administration of peer reviews of firms that audit 
less than five SEC clients.
The Board believes that these changes are responsive to 
concerns expressed by smaller firms and do not weaken in any way the 
Section's effectiveness.
C. Changes in Membership  
A summary of the changes in the membership of the Section 
is presented below:
Breakdown by 
Number of SEC Clients
Total 
Number 
of Firms
5 or 
More
Less 
Than 5 None
March 31, 1979 550 44 167 339
New Members 140 9 54 77
Resignations (112) - (24) (88)
Mergers (4) (1) (1) (2)
Reclassifications, net - (10) 7 3
March 31, 1980 574 42 203 329
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The increase during the year in the number of accounting 
firms that are members of the Section was disappointing to the 
Section and the Board, especially in light of the changes made in 
the Section's membership requirements in order to encourage new 
members. The SEC has noted with concern that approximately 600 
accounting firms that audit at least one SEC client have still not 
joined the Section. Without minimizing that concern, there have 
been some positive signs. For example, there has been a positive 
trend in the number of U.S. companies listed on the New York Stock 
Exchange and the American Stock Exchange that are audited by member 
firms, as indicated in the following tabulation:
NYSE ASE
Listed U.S. companies whose auditors 
were not members of the Section at
March 31, 1979 11 64
Less: Companies whose auditors
during the year
—  joined the Section
—  resigned from the Section
Companies that changed to auditors who
—  are members of the Section 2 4
—  are not members of the Section (1)
6 20 
(1 )
Effect of changes in listed companies 
—  net - 3
Listed U.S. companies whose auditors 
were not members of the Section at
March 31, 1980 4 38
More importantly, the firms that are members of the 
Section do represent, in terms of the SEC clients they audit, a
significant commitment to effective self regulation. The Section's
records indicate that member firms audit 8,880 SEC clients and that 
those clients represent
• 92% of the estimated 9,700 companies
required to file financial statements with 
the SEC under various sections of the
Securities Act of 1933 or the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934.
• All but 4 of the U.S. companies listed on
the New York Stock Exchange (based on
December 1979 NYSE listing). 
• All but 38 of the U.S. companies listed on 
the American Stock Exchange (based on 
December 1979 ASE listing).
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• 93% of the 2 , 0 2 1 companies included in NASD 
listings of over-the-counter securities re­
ported in the January 8, 1980, Wall Street 
Journal that could be located in Moody's 
Complete Corporate Index.
D. Efforts of the Section to Increase Membership
During the year, the Section continued its efforts to 
increase membership by appealing directly to firms that had not yet 
joined and by engaging in general promotional activities.
• A December 1977 "Auditor Listing" obtained 
from Disclosure Incorporated included the 
names of approximately 325 accounting firms 
that could not be identified in AICPA 
records. The Section, with the aid of 
member firms and state societies, was able 
to locate addresses for 161 of those firms 
and mailed them appropriate promotional 
literature.
• The Section contacted by telephone all 
nonmember firms that audit five or more SEC 
clients and a sample of firms that audit one 
to four SEC clients. (Information gained 
from these conversations was useful to the 
Section in deciding on the changes that were 
made in the Section's requirement.)
• Personal letters were sent to firms that 
audit one or more SEC clients but are 
members only of the Private Companies 
Practice Section.
• Letters were sent to firms that are not 
members of the Section and that are included 
in the fourth edition of Who Audits America.
• A brochure was published on the Division for 
CPA Firms and given wide distribution, 
including a gratis distribution to all 
members of the Robert Morris Associates. •
• Representatives of member firms, partic­
ularly those on the Executive and Peer 
Review Committees, and the Section's staff 
have accepted all available opportunities 
to speak or write about the Section's 
activities. In that connection, the
executive directors of certain larger state 
societies have been specifically asked for 
help in identifying speaking opportunities 
for representatives of the Section and the 
Board.
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Although these activities represent a significant effort, 
results have been limited and disappointing. However, because of 
the importance of improving the public perception of the Section's 
effectiveness, the Board believes these activities should be 
continued.
E. External Factors
In June 1979, the Board received a letter from the staff 
of the New York Stock Exchange, accompanied by a list of 101 
accounting firms, requesting information as to whether those firms 
were members of the Section. Not all 101 firms audit SEC clients, 
as defined; many audit broker dealers. Seventy-eight of those 
firms were not members of the Section, and each was advised that the 
requested information had been sent to the New York Stock Exchange.
F. Publication of Directory of Member Firms
At its Spring 1979 meeting, the AICPA Council agreed to 
publish, during the Summer of 1980, a directory of firms that are 
members of the Division for CPA Firms, which would not include 
section designation.
The Board understands that many firms that are not 
members of the SEC Practice Section are strongly opposed to section 
designation in any directory. The Board continues to hold the 
view, as previously communicated to the Section's Executive 
Committee, that there is "substantial disadvantage in the 
indefinite prolongation of a policy of non-disclosure of the 
identity of members of the SEC Practice Section...."
G. Disclosure of Section Membership in Proxy Statements
SEC Chairman Williams, in a speech on January 3, 1980, 
stated that the SEC's staff is considering requiring registrants to 
disclose in proxy statements whether their auditing firms are 
members of the Section and whether they have been subjected to a 
peer review. The Board believes that this suggestion recognizes 
the benefits accruing to the public from membership in the Section, 
and more particularly from the requirement that member firms 
undergo triennial peer reviews. Moreover, a direct salutary effect 
of such a requirement would be to increase the pressure on 
accounting firms to join the Section. Accordingly, the Board would 
favor such a disclosure requirement.
The Board urges the profession to seek out speaking op­
portunities before financial analysts, bankers and other users of 
financial statements to inform them of the Section's purpose and 
especially of its peer review program. Such publicity could cause 
financial statement user groups to induce audit firms to become 
members of the Section.
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VII. CONCLUSIONS
The Board believes that in the past year the Section has 
shown continued strong commitment to the success of its self- 
regulatory program. This is evidenced by (1) further progress in 
developing and administering its peer review program, (2) adoption 
of an initial program for surveillance and disciplinary action in 
cases of alleged or possible audit failure, (3) the review of the 
auditor's work environment, (4) efforts to enlarge membership of 
the Section, and (5) continued attention to the scope of services 
issue. The SEC continues to be supportive with its constructive 
criticism and comments.
The Section will face many challenges in 1980-1981 to 
make its programs more effective. The SIC will have the 
opportunity to develop surveillance and investigatory procedures. 
The increased activity in peer reviews will require a major 
expenditure of time by the profession and the Board. The Board 
believes, however, that the experience thus far gained will enable 
the profession to make continued progress in 1980 and the years 
ahead.
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EXHIBITS
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Exhibit I
COMPOSITION OF PUBLIC OVERSIGHT BOARD 
YEAR ENDING DECEMBER 31, 1980
Name Position Term Expires Affiliation
John J. McCloy Chairman December 31, 1980 Partner, Milbank, Tweed, 
Hadley & McCloy, New York
Ray Garrett, Jr.* Vice-
Chairman
December 31, 1981 Partner, Gardner, Carton 
& Douglas, Chicago
William L. Cary Member December 31, 1981 Professor of law, Columbia 
University, New York
John D. Harper Member December 31, 1982 Former chairman of the 
board and chief executive 
officer of Aluminum Company 
of America, Pittsburgh
Arthur M. Wood Member December 31, 1982 Former chairman of the 
board and chief executive 
officer of Sears, Roebuck 
& Co., Chicago
Staff and Counsel to Board Members
Richard A. Stark Secretary of Board Partner, Milbank, Tweed,
and Counsel to Hadley & McCloy, New York
Mr. McCloy
Charles R. Manzoni, Jr. Counsel to
Mr. Garrett
Louis W. Matusiak Executive Director
Charles J. Evers Technical Director
Partner, Gardner, Carton 
& Douglas, Chicago
*Mr. Garrett died on February 3, 1980. As of this date, his replacement 
has not been selected.
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Exhibit II
PUBLIC OVERSIGHT BOARD 
STATEMENT OF ACTUAL EXPENSES 
FOR THE YEAR ENDING JULY 31, 1979 
AND STATEMENT OF ESTIMATED EXPENSES 
FOR THE YEAR ENDING JULY 31, 1980
Regular fees of board members
Fees for professional services 
paid to firms of board members: 
Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy 
Gardner, Carton & Douglas
Reimbursement of expenses to 
Board members and their firms:
Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy 
Gardner, Carton & Douglas 
All others
Estimated 
Expenses for 
12 Months 
Ending
July 31, 1980 
$180,000
75,000
50,000
12,000
14,000
8,000
Actual 
Expenses for 
12 Months 
Ending
July 31, 1979 
$147,500
100,250
70,752
10,945
10,340
4,355
Salaries of staff, including 
part-time reviewers
Office expenses:
Personnel 
Occupancy 
Printing and paper 
General
Total office expenses 
Total expenses
200,000 161,773
25,000 23,633
29,000 21,131
4,000 11,713
55,000 55,225
113,000 111,702
$652,000 $617,617
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Exhibit III
Organizational Structure and 
Functions of the SEC Practice 
Section of the AICPA Division for 
CPA Firms
I. Source of Authority
The section was established by a resolution of the Council of
the AICPA adopted on September 17, 1977.
II. Name
The name of the section shall be the “SEC Practice Section”
of the AICPA Division for CPA Firms.
III. Objectives
The objectives of the section shall be to achieve the following:
1. Improve the quality of practice by CPA firms before the 
Securities and Exchange Commission through the estab­
lishment of practice requirements for member firms.
2. Establish and maintain an effective system of self-regula­
tion of member firms by means of mandatory peer reviews, 
required maintenance of appropriate quality controls, 
and the imposition of sanctions for failure to meet 
membership requirements.
3. Enhance the effectiveness of the section’s regulatory system 
through the monitoring and evaluation activities of an 
independent oversight board composed of public mem­
bers.
4. Provide a forum for development of technical information 
relating to SEC practice.
IV. Membership
1. Eligibility and Admission of Members
All CPA firms are eligible for membership in the section 
even though they do not practice before the SEC. Mem­
bership in the section shall not constitute membership in 
the AICPA nor entitle any member firm to any of the
35
rights or privileges of membership in the AICPA. To 
become a member, a firm must submit to the section a 
written application agreeing to abide by all of the re­
quirements for membership. The application must be 
accompanied by firm information for the most recent full 
fiscal year as described under 3 (g) of this section.
The membership of the section shall consist of all 
firms which meet with the admission requirements and 
continue to maintain their membership in good standing.
2. Termination and Reinstatement of Members
(a) Membership of a CPA firm may be terminated—
(1) By submission of a resignation, provided the 
firm is not the subject of a pending investiga­
tion or recommendation of the peer review 
committee for sanctions or other disciplinary 
action by the executive committee or under 
review by the public oversight board.
(2) By action of the executive committee for 
failure to adhere to the requirements of mem­
bership.
(b) Membership of a terminated CPA firm may be 
reinstated—
(1) By complying with the admission requirements 
for new members if termination occurred by 
resignation.
(2) By complying with the admission requirements 
for new members and obtaining the approval of 
the executive committee if termination was 
imposed as a sanction.
3. Requirements of Members
Member firms shall be obligated to abide by the following:
(a) Ensure that a majority of members of the firm are 
CPAs, that the firm can legally engage in the practice 
of public accounting, and that each proprietor, 
shareholder, or partner of the firm resident in the 
United States and eligible for AICPA membership 
is a member of the AICPA.
(b) Adhere to quality control standards established by 
the AICPA Quality Control Standards Committee.
(c) Submit to peer reviews of the firm’s accounting and 
audit practice every three years or at such additional 
times as designated by the executive committee, the 
reviews to be conducted in accordance with review
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standards established by the section’s peer review 
committee (see Appendix C).
(d) Ensure that all professionals in the firm resident in 
the United States, including CPAs and non-CPAs, 
participate in at least one hundred twenty hours 
of continuing professional education over three 
years, but in not less than twenty hours in any given 
year.1
(e) Assign a new audit partner to be in charge of each 
SEC engagement2 that has had another audit part­
ner-in-charge for a period of five consecutive years 
and prohibit such incumbent partner from return­
ing to in-charge status on the engagement for a 
minimum of two years except as follows:
(1) This requirement shall not become effective 
until two years after a firm becomes a member.3
(2) In unusual circumstances, the chief executive 
partner of a firm or his designee may grant no 
more than one two-year extension so long as 
there is an in-depth supplemental review by 
another partner.
(3) An application for relief is granted by the 
peer review committee on the basis of unusual 
hardships.
(f) Ensure that a concurring review of the audit report 
by a partner other than the audit partner in charge 
of an SEC engagement is required before issuance 
of an audit report on the financial statements of an 
SEC registrant (see Appendix E).4 The peer review 
committee may authorize alternative procedures 
where this requirement cannot be met because of 
the size of the member firm.
1 See section 6 of this manual for additional information about the continuing 
professional education requirement, including a requirement to file an annual 
educational report within four months after the completion of each educational 
year.
2 See Appendix D—“Definition of an SEC Engagement,” for purposes of deter­
mining compliance with the membership requirements of 3(e), (f), and (g) of 
this section.
3 Effective for audits of financial statements of SEC clients for periods ending 
after June 30, 1980, or two years after the date the firm becomes a member, 
whichever is later.
4 Effective for audits of financial statements of SEC clients for periods ending
after June 30, 1978, or the date the firm becomes a member, whichever is later.
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(g) File with the section for each fiscal year of the United 
States firm (covering offices maintained in the 
United States and its territories) the following in­
formation, within ninety days of the end of such 
fiscal year, to be open to public inspection:5
(1) Form of business entity (e.g., partnership or 
corporation) and identification of domestic 
affiliates rendering services to clients.
(2) Description or chart of internal organizational 
structure and international organization (in­
cluding the nature of relationships main­
tained in each geographic region).
(3) Number and location of offices.
(4) Total number of partners and non-CPAs with 
parallel status within the firm’s organizational 
structure.
(5) Total number of CPAs (including partners).
(6) Total number of professional staff (including 
partners).
(7) Total number of personnel (including item 
6, above).
(8) Number and names of SEC clients for which 
the firm is principal auditor-of-record and any 
changes of such clients.
(9) Number of SEC audit clients each of whose 
total domestic fees exceed 5 percent of total 
domestic firm fees and the percentage which 
each of these clients’ fees represents to total 
domestic firm fees.
(10) A statement indicating that the firm has com­
plied with AICPA and SEC independence re­
quirements.
(11) Disclosure regarding pending litigation as re­
quired under generally accepted accounting 
principles and indicating whether such pend­
ing litigation is expected to have a material 
effect on the firm’s financial condition or its 
ability to serve clients.
(12) Gross fees for accounting and auditing, tax, 
and MAS expressed as a percentage of total 
gross fees. 6
5  The annual report should disclose the member firm's educational year, if 
different from its fiscal year, and any change in the educational year (see 
section 6 of this manual, I.C).
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(13) Gross fees for both MAS and tax services per­
formed for SEC audit clients, expressed as a 
percentage of total fees charged to all SEC 
audit clients.
(h) Maintain such minimum amounts and types of 
accountants’ liability insurance as shall be prescribed 
from time to time by the executive committee.
(i) Adhere to the portions of the AICPA Code of Pro­
fessional Ethics and Management Advisory Services 
Practice Standards dealing with independence in 
performing management advisory services for audit 
clients whose securities are registered with the SEC. 
Refrain from performing for such clients services 
that are inconsistent with the firm's responsibilities 
to the public or that consist of the following types 
of services:
(1) Psychological testing.
(2) Public opinion polls.
(3) Merger and acquisition assistance for a finder’s 
fee.
(4) Executive recruitment as described in Appen­
dix A.
(5) Actuarial services to insurance companies as 
described in Appendix A.
(j) Report annually to the audit committee or board of 
directors (or its equivalent in a partnership) of each 
SEC audit client on the total fees received from the 
client for management advisory services during the 
year under audit and a description of the types of 
such services rendered.
(k) Report to the audit committee or board of directors 
(or its equivalent in a partnership) of each SEC 
audit client on the nature of disagreements with the 
management of the client on financial accounting 
and reporting matters and auditing procedures 
which, if not satisfactorily resolved, would have 
caused the issuance of a qualified opinion on the 
client’s financial statements.6
(l) Pay dues as established by the executive committee 
and comply with the rules and regulations of the 
section, as established from time to time by the
6 Effective for audits of financial statements of SEC clients for periods ending 
after June 30, 1978, or the date the firm becomes a member, whichever is later.
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executive committee, and with the decisions of the 
executive committee in respect of matters within 
its competence; in connection with their duties, in­
cluding disciplinary proceedings, cooperate with the 
peer review committee and the special investiga­
tions committee established by resolution of the 
executive committee as set out in the Appendix B 
hereto; and comply with any sanction that may be 
imposed by the executive committee.
(m) Report to the special investigations committee, with­
in 30 days of service on the firm or its personnel 
of the first pleading in the matter or within 30 days 
of joining the section if later,7 any litigation (in­
cluding criminal indictments) against it or its per­
sonnel, or any proceeding or investigation publicly 
announced by a regulatory agency, commenced on 
or after November 1, 1979 (not including additional 
proceedings arising out of or related to facts involved 
in litigation originally filed prior to November 1, 
1979), that involves clients or former clients that 
are SEC registrants and that alleges deficiencies in 
the conduct of an audit or reporting thereon in 
connection with any required filing under the 
Federal securities laws.8 W ith respect to matters 
previously reported under this subparagraph, mem­
ber firms shall report to the committee additional 
proceedings, settlements, court decisions on sub­
stantive issues, and the filing of appeals within 30 
days of their occurrence.
V. Governing Bodies
The activities of the section shall be governed by an execu­
tive committee having senior status within the AICPA with 
authority to carry out the activities of the section. Such 
activities shall not conflict with the policies and standards
7 Since the Committee is not expected to be appointed before December 1979, 
the first report by member firms is to be filed by January 31, 1980. The initial 
report shall identify the litigation and be accompanied by copies of the com­
plaints or indictment or other charges filed with the courts involved.
8 An allegation in such formal litigation, proceeding or investigation that a 
member firm or its personnel have violated the Federal securities laws in con­
nections with services other than an audit for an SEC registrant shall be 
reported.
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of the AICPA. All activities of the section shall be subject 
to the oversight and public reporting thereon by a public 
oversight board.
Executive Committee
1. Composition and Terms
(a) The executive committee shall be composed of 
representatives of at least twenty-one member firms.
(b) The terms of executive committee members shall 
be for three years, with initial staggered terms to 
provide for seven expirations each year.
(c) Executive committee members shall continue in 
office until their successors have been appointed.
2. Appointment
(a) T he members of the executive committee shall be 
appointed by the AICPA chairman with the ap­
proval of the AICPA Board of Directors.
(b) All appointments after the initial executive commit­
tee is established shall also require approval of the 
then existing executive committee.
(c) Nominations for appointments of representatives of 
member firms to the executive committee shall be 
provided to the chairman of the AICPA by a 
nominating committee of the section. The section’s 
nominating committee shall be elected by the 
AICPA Council and consist of individuals drawn 
from seven of the member firms of the section. It 
is intended that nominations shall adhere to the 
principle that the executive committee shall at all
  times include representatives of all member firms 
which audit the financial statements of thirty or 
more registrants under section 12 of the Securities 
and Exchange Act of 1934 and at least five represen­
tatives of firms which audit financial statements of 
fewer than thirty such registrants plus one addi­
tional such representative for each representative, in 
excess of sixteen, of firms which audit thirty or more 
registrants.
3. Election of Chairman
The chairman of the executive committee shall be elected
from among its members to serve at the pleasure of the
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executive committee but in no event for more than three
one-year terms.
4. Responsibilities and Functions
The executive committee shall—
(a) Establish general policies for the section and over­
see its activities.
(b) Amend requirements for membership as necessary, 
but in no event shall such requirements be designed 
so as to unreasonably preclude membership by any 
CPA firm.
(c) Establish budgets and dues requirements to fund 
activities of the section not provided for in the 
AICPA general budget. Such dues shall be scaled 
in proportion to the size of member firms.
(d) Determine sanctions to be imposed on member 
firms based upon recommendations of the peer re­
view committee of the section.
(e) Receive, evaluate, and act upon other complaints 
received with respect to actions of member firms.
(f) Establish the initial public oversight board with the 
approval of the AICPA Board of Directors.
(g) Appoint persons to serve on such committees and 
task forces as necessary to carry out its functions.
(h) Make recommendations to other AICPA boards and 
committees for their consideration.
(i) Consult from time to time with the public oversight 
board.
5. Quorum, Voting, Meetings, and Attendance
(a) A majority of the members of the executive com­
mittee or their designated alternates must be present 
to constitute a quorum.
(b) Affirmative votes of a majority of the members of 
the executive committee shall be required for action 
on all matters.
(c) Meetings of the executive committee shall be held 
at such times and places as determined by the 
chairman.
(d) Representatives of member firms of the section may 
attend meetings of the executive committee as ob­
servers under rules established by the executive com­
mittee. Such attendance will not be permitted 
when the committee is considering disciplinary 
matters.
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VII. Public Oversight Board
1. Size, Appointment, Removal, and Compensation
The public oversight board shall consist of five members. 
Members of such board shall be drawn from among 
prominent individuals of high integrity and reputation, 
including, but not limited to, former public officials, 
lawyers, bankers, securities industry executives, educators, 
economists, and business executives.
Following its initial appointment, the public over­
sight board shall, in consultation with and subject to the 
approval of the AICPA Board of Directors, appoint, re­
move, and set the terms and compensation of its members 
and select its chairman. However, such board shall auto­
matically terminate in the event of the termination of the 
SEC practice section of the AICPA Division for CPA 
Firms.
2. Responsibilities and Functions 
The public oversight board shall—
(a) Monitor and evaluate the regulatory and sanction 
activities of the peer review and executive commit­
tees to assure their effectiveness.
(b) Determine that the peer review committee is as­
certaining that firms are taking appropriate action 
as a result of peer reviews.
(c) Conduct continuing oversight of all other activities 
of the section.
(d) Make recommendations to the executive committee 
for improvements in the operations of the section.
(e) Publish an annual report and such other reports 
as may be deemed necessary with respect to its 
activities.
(f) Engage staff to assist in carrying out its functions. 
(g) Have the right for any or all of its members to 
attend any meetings of the executive committee.
VIII. Peer Reviews
1. Review Requirements
Peer reviews of member firms shall be conducted every 
three years or at such additional times as designated by 
the executive committee (see Appendix C).
2. Peer Review Committee
(a) Composition and appointment
The peer review committee shall be a continuing
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committee appointed by the executive committee 
and shall consist of fifteen individuals selected from 
member firms.
(b) Responsibilities and functions
The peer review committee shall—
(1) Administer the program of peer reviews for 
member firms.
(2) Establish standards for conducting reviews.
(3) Establish standards for reports on peer reviews 
and publication of such reports.
(4) Recommend sanctions and other disciplinary 
decisions (including whether the name of the 
affected firm is published) to the executive 
committee.
(5) Consult from time to time with the public 
oversight board.
(6) Keep appropriate records of peer reviews which 
have been conducted.
3. Peer Review Objectives
T he objectives of peer reviews shall be to determine
that—
(a) Member firms, as distinguished from individuals, 
are maintaining and applying quality controls in 
accordance with standards established by the AICPA 
Quality Control Standards Committee. Reviews for 
this purpose shall include a review of working 
papers rather than specific “cases.” (The existence 
of “cases” in a firm might raise questions concerning 
its quality controls.)
(b) By reviewing the procedures of member firms, ap­
propriate steps are being taken to gain proper as­
surance about the quality of work done on those 
portions of audits performed in other countries.
(c) Member firms are meeting membership require­
ments.
IX. Sanctions Against Firms
1. Authority to Impose Sanctions
The executive committee shall have the authority to im­
pose sanctions on member firms either on its own initia­
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tive or on the basis of recommendations of the peer re­
view committee and shall establish procedures designed 
to assure due process to firms in connection with dis­
ciplinary proceedings.
2. Types of Sanctions
The following types of sanctions may be imposed on 
member firms for failure to maintain compliance with 
the requirements for membership:
(a) Require corrective measures by the firm including 
consideration by the firm of appropriate actions 
with respect to individual firm personnel.
(b) Additional requirements for continuing professional 
education.
(c) Accelerated or special peer reviews.
(d) Admonishments, censures, or reprimands.
(e) Monetary fines.
(f) Suspension from membership.
(g) Expulsion from membership.
X. Financing and Staffing of Section
1. Section Staff and Meeting Costs
(a) The president of the AICPA shall appoint a staff 
director and assign such other staff as may be re­
quired by the section.
(b) The cost of the section staff and normal meeting 
costs shall be paid out of the general budget of the 
AICPA.
2. Public Oversight Board and Special Projects
(a) The costs of the public oversight board and its staff 
shall be paid out of the dues of the section.
(b) T he cost of special projects shall be paid out of the 
dues of the section.
XI. Relationship to Other AICPA Segments
Nothing in the organizational structure and functions of this 
section shall be construed as taking the place of or changing 
the operations of existing senior committees of the AICPA 
or the status of individual CPAs as members of the AICPA.
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APPENDIX A— Executive Recruiting and Insurance 
Actuarial Services
Executive Recruiting Services
The hiring of persons for managerial, executive, or director 
positions is a function that is properly the client’s responsibility. 
Accordingly, the member firm’s role in this function should be 
limited. In serving an audit client whose securities are registered 
with the SEC (including subsidiaries and affiliates of such clients), 
a member firm should not
1. Accept an engagement to search for, or seek out, prospective 
candidates for managerial, executive, or director positions with 
its audit clients. This would not preclude giving the name of a 
prospective candidate known to someone in the member firm, 
provided such knowledge was not obtained as a result of the 
performance of executive recruiting services for another client.
2. Engage in psychological testing, other formal testing or evalua­
tion programs, or undertake reference checks of prospective 
candidates for an executive or director position.
3. Act as a negotiator on the client’s behalf; for example, in deter­
mining position status or title, compensation, fringe benefits, 
or other conditions of employment.
4. Recommend, or advise the client to hire, a specific candidate for 
a specific job. However, a member firm may, upon request by 
the client, interview candidates and advise the client on the 
candidate’s competence for financial, accounting, administrative, 
or control positions.
When a client seeks to fill a position within its organization 
that is related to its system of accounting, financial, or administrative 
controls, the client will frequently approach employees of the 
member firm directly as candidates or seek referral of the member 
firm’s employees who may be considering employment outside of 
the profession. Such employment from time to time is an inevit­
able consequence of the training and experience that the public 
accounting profession provides to its staff, is beneficial to all con­
cerned, including society in general, and therefore is not proscribed.
Insurance Actuarial Services
Actuarial skills are both accounting and auditing related. The 
bodies of knowledge supporting the actuarial and accounting pro­
fessions have a substantial degree of overlap. Both professions in­
volve the analysis of various factors of time, probability, and eco­
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nomics and the quantification of such analysis in financial terms. 
The results of their work are significantly interrelated. The pro­
fessions are logical extensions of each other; indeed, they have been 
practiced jointly for many years and even shared the same pro­
fessional society in Scotland prior to their becoming established 
in the United States.
The work of actuarial specialists generally is necessary to obtain 
audit satisfaction in support of insurance policy and loss reserves. 
To assist them in meeting their audit responsibilities, a number 
of CPA firms have hired qualified actuaries of their own.
The actuarial function is basic to the operation and manage­
ment of an insurance company. Management’s responsibility for 
this function cannot be assumed by the CPA firm without jeopard­
izing the CPA firm’s independence. Because of the special sig­
nificance of a CPA firm’s appearance of independence when auditing 
publicly held insurance companies—
1. The CPA firm should not render actuarially oriented advisory 
services involving the determination of policy reserves and re­
lated accounts to its audit clients unless such clients use their 
own actuaries or third-party actuaries to provide management 
with the primary actuarial capabilities. This does not pre­
clude the use of the CPA firm’s actuarial staff in connection 
with the auditing of such reserves.
2. Whenever the CPA firm renders actuarially oriented advisory 
services, it must satisfy itself that it is acting in an advisory 
capacity and that the responsibility for any significant actuarial 
methods and assumptions is accepted by the client.
3. The CPA firm should not render actuarially oriented advisory 
services when the CPA firm’s involvement is continuous because 
such a relationship might be perceived as an engagement to per­
form a management function.
Subject to the above limitations, it is appropriate for the CPA 
firm to render certain actuarially oriented advisory services to its 
audit clients. Such services include:
1. Assisting management to develop appropriate methods, assump­
tions, and amounts for policy and loss reserves and other actuarial 
items presented in financial reports based on the company’s 
historical experience, current practice, and future plans.
2. Assisting management in the conversion of financial statements 
from a statutory basis to one conforming with generally accepted 
accounting principles.
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3. Analyzing actuarial considerations and alternatives in federal 
income tax planning.
4. Assisting management in the financial analyses of various matters 
such as proposed new policies, new markets, business acquisitions, 
and reinsurance needs.
(Approved by the executive committee June 21, 1979.)
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APPENDIX B— Resolution Establishing the Special 
Investigations Committee
WHEREAS: The objectives of the SEC practice section include 
the improvement of the quality of practice by CPA firms before 
the SEC through the establishment of practice requirements for 
member firms, and the establishment and maintenance of an effec­
tive system of self-regulation of member firms by various means 
including the imposition of sanctions for failure to meet member­
ship requirements; and
WHEREAS: T he executive committee is authorized to carry 
out the activities of the section and to receive, evaluate, and act 
upon complaints received with respect to actions of member firms, 
impose sanctions and establish procedures designed to assure due 
process to firms in connection with disciplinary proceedings, and 
appoint persons to serve on such committees and task forces as are 
necessary to carry out its functions;
IT  IS HEREBY RESOLVED T H A T :
There is hereby established a special investigations committee 
consisting of nine partners or retired partners of different mem­
ber firms who, under procedures established by the executive 
committee, shall make such investigation as it considers nec­
essary to (a) determine whether facts relating to alleged audit 
failures (1) indicate a possible need for corrective measures 
by the member firm involved, (2) indicate that changes in 
generally accepted auditing standards or quality control stand­
ards need to be considered, or (3) indicate that sanctions should 
be imposed on the member firm involved, and (b) recommend 
to the executive committee such actions as are deemed ap­
propriate.
(Approved by the executive committee August 7, 1979.)
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APPENDIX C— Timing off Peer Reviews and 
Filing of Reports
T he executive committee has established the following time­
table according to which member firms must have their initial peer 
reviews completed.
Calendar Year Firm 
Joins the Section
1978
1979
1980
1981 and subsequent 
calendar years
Initial Peer Review 
Must Be Completed
December 31, 19801 
December 31, 1981 
December 31, 1981 
One year from the 
date the firm joins 
the section.
A member firm’s subsequent peer reviews must be completed 
by the end of the third calendar year following the calendar year 
that included the previous review year-end. Although it is expected 
that a firm ordinarily will not change its review year-end, a firm 
may do so without the peer review committee's prior approval, pro­
vided that the new review year-end is not beyond three months of 
the previous review year-end and provided that the peer review 
is completed in accordance with the requirement in the preceding 
sentence.
T he review team’s report on the peer review is to be filed with 
the peer review committee promptly (but no later than sixty days) 
after the completion of the peer review. The report should be 
accompanied, if applicable, by the quality control review panel’s 
report, the review team’s letter of comments on matters that may 
require action by the reviewed firm, and the reviewed firm’s response 
to that letter. Upon application by a member firm, the peer review 
committee may grant one sixty-day extension for filing the report.
(Approved by the executive committee June 21, 1979.)
1 Certain randomly selected member firms with less than five SEC clients will be 
granted an extension until December 31, 1981, to have their initial peer review 
completed. The purpose of this extension is to equalize the number of peer 
reviews to achieve an appropriately balanced work load.
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APPENDIX D— Definition of an SEC Engagement
For purposes of implementing the membership requirements 
of section IV 3(e) and (f) of the organizational structure and 
functions document with respect to partner rotation and concurring 
review, the executive committee has defined an SEC engagement as 
the examination of the financial statements of
1. An issuer making an initial filing, including amendments, under 
the Securities Act of 1933.
2. Registrants that file periodic reports (for example, Forms N-1R 
and 10-K) with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
under the Investment Company Act of 1940 or the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934 (except brokers or dealers registered only 
because of section 15 (a) of that ac t) .
When an existing audit engagement becomes an SEC engage­
ment, time served as partner in charge of the engagement before it 
became an SEC engagement is to be considered in applying the five- 
year partner rotation requirement. However, the incumbent partner 
may serve as partner in charge of the engagement for two consecu­
tive annual examinations subsequent to the date of the latest annual 
audited financial statements included in the filing.
Examples of entities that are not encompassed by the above defi­
nition include
1. Banks and other lending institutions that file periodic reports 
with the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Reserve Sys­
tem, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, or the Federal 
Home Loan Bank Board, because the powers, functions, and 
duties of the SEC to enforce its periodic reporting provisions are 
vested, pursuant to section 12 (i) of that act, in those agencies.
2. Subsidiaries or investees (including regulation S-X rule 4-02 (e) 
companies) of an entity encompassed by the definition of an SEC 
engagement, which subsidiaries or investees are not themselves 
entities encompassed by such definition, even though their finan­
cial statements may be presented separately in parent and/or 
investor companies’ filings under the 1934 act.
3. Companies whose financial statements appear in the annual 
reports and/or proxy statements of investment funds because 
they are sponsors or managers of such funds, provided they are 
not themselves registrants required to file periodic reports under 
the 1940 act or section 13 or 15 (d) of the 1934 act.
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The executive committee has also authorized the foregoing 
definition for purposes of determining the names of clients for 
which a firm is the principal auditor of record and any changes of 
such clients for which information is required (under the member­
ship requirements) to be filed with the section for each fiscal year 
of a U.S. member firm (see section IV 3 (g) of the organizational 
structure and functions docum ent).
The foregoing definition of an SEC engagement is not intended 
to change section VI 2 (c) of the organization structure and functions 
document regarding the appointment of members to the executive 
committee of the section.
(Approved by the executive committee October 25, 1978.)
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A member firm of the SEC practice section agrees to ensure 
that a concurring review of the audit report by a partner other than 
the audit partner in charge of an SEC engagement is required 
before issuance of an audit report on the financial statements of 
an SEC registrant.1 This requirement also applies to the reissuance 
of such an audit report.
The purpose of the review is to provide additional assurance 
that (1) the financial statements are in conformity with generally 
accepted accounting principles or other comprehensive basis of 
accounting and (2) the firm’s report thereon is in accordance with 
generally accepted auditing standards.
The partner assigned as the concurring reviewer should make 
an objective review of the significant accounting and auditing con­
siderations influencing the firm's report. His responsibilities include 
reading the financial statements and the firm’s report thereon. The 
concurring reviewer should be informed regarding significant 
accounting, auditing, or reporting considerations.
T he concurring partner may deem it necessary to review rele­
vant working papers to understand significant accounting, auditing, 
or reporting considerations.
If the concurring partner and the partner in charge of the 
engagement have differing views regarding important matters, the 
disagreement should be resolved in accordance with applicable 
firm policy.2
T he engagement files should contain evidence that the con­
curring review was completed prior to the issuance of the firm’s 
report.
APPENDIX E— Scope of Concurring Review
(Approved by the executive committee October 25, 1978.)
1 The peer review committee may authorize alternative procedures when this 
requirement cannot be met because of the size of the member firm.
2 See SAS no. 22, Planning and Supervision.
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Exhibit IV
Representatives of Firms That Audit 30 or More Registrants 
Under Section 12 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934
Representative
Archibald E. MacKay, 
Ivan O . Bull 
George R. Catlett 
Robert M. Coffman 
Robert L. Ferst 
W. Donald Georgen 
Howard Groveman 
Ray J. Groves 
Walter E. Hanson 
William S. Kanaga 
William B. Keast 
Bernard Z. Lee 
Charles G. Steele 
John W. Zick
Representatives of Firms That Audit Fewer Than 30 Registrants 
Under Section 12 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934
Representative
Peter Arnstein 
Robert R. Harden 
Raymond L. Hellmuth 
Irving S. Kroll 
John J. van Benten 
Bert B. Weinstein 
Gary J. Wolfe
EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE 
SEC PRACTICE SECTION 
1979-1980
Firm Affiliation
Chairman Main Hurdman & Cranstoun
McGladrey, Hendrickson & Co. 
Arthur Andersen & Co.
Fox & Company 
Laventhol & Horwath 
Touche Ross & Co.
Alexander Grant & Company 
Ernst & Whinney 
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. 
Arthur Young & Co.
Coopers & Lybrand 
Seidman & Seidman 
Deloitte Haskins & Sells 
Price Waterhouse & Co.
Firm Affiliation
John F. Forbes & Company 
Clarkson, Harden & Gantt 
Meahl, McNamara & Co.
Kenneth Leventhal & Co.
Geo. S. Olive & Co. 
Altschuler, Melvoin & Glasser 
Cherry, Bekaert & Holland
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Exhibit V
THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS COMMITTEE 
OF THE SEC PRACTICE SECTION OF THE 
AICPA DIVISION FOR CPA FIRMS
November 29, 1979
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FOREWORD
This document sets forth the procedure established by the 
executive committee to govern the operations of the Special Inves­
tigations Committee of the SEC Practice Section of the AICPA 
Division for CPA Firms. The Special Investigations Committee was 
formed pursuant to a resolution of the Section's executive com­
mittee that has been published as Appendix B to the Organizational 
Structure and Functions document of the Section.
A separate document, Rules of Procedure for the Imposition of 
Sanctions, sets forth procedures established by the executive com­
mittee that are designed to assure due process to firms in connection 
with all proceedings related to the imposition of sanctions under­
taken by the Section.
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I. Objectives
II. Committee Structure and Procedures
III. General Considerations
IV. Information to be Reported to and Screened by 
the Committee
V. Coordination with the Professional Ethics Division
VI. Screening Procedures
VII. Monitoring Procedures
VIII. Investigations —  General Policies
IX. Investigations of Member Firms
X. Investigations of Cases
XI. Disposition of Cases
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THE SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS COMMITTEE 
OF THE SEC PRACTICE SECTION OF THE 
AICPA DIVISION FOR CPA FIRMS
I. OBJECTIVES
The Special Investigations Committee (the "Committee") has 
been established by the executive committee of the SEC Practice 
Section in recognition of the significant public interest in 
matters concerning the practice of public accounting that have 
a bearing on the reliability of financial statements of SEC 
registrants. Those matters relate to such considerations as the 
adequacy of generally accepted auditing standards and quality 
control standards, compliance by member firms with those standards 
in the conduct of their accounting and audit practice and, when 
necessary, the imposition of sanctions on member firms.
The Section has established membership requirements that 
provide, among other things, for a peer review of each member 
firm's accounting and audit practice at least every three years 
and that empower the executive committee to impose sanctions on 
member firms for failure to meet the membership requirements.
The Committee's primary objectives are as follows:
1. Assist in providing reasonable assurance to the 
public and to the profession that member firms are 
complying with professional standards in the conduct 
of their practice before the Securities and Exchange 
Commission by identifying corrective measures, if any, 
that should be taken by a member firm involved in a 
specific alleged audit failure.
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2. Assist in improving the quality of practice by member 
firms before the Securities and Exchange Commission by 
determining whether facts relating to specific alleged 
audit failures indicate that changes in generally accepted 
auditing standards or quality control standards need to be 
considered.
3. Recommend to the executive committee, when deemed 
necessary, appropriate sanctions with respect to the 
member firms involved.
II. COMMITTEE STRUCTURE AND PROCEDURES
The Committee structure and procedures shall be as follows:
1. The Committee shall be composed of nine members who 
are partners or retired partners of different member firms. 
Committee members shall be appointed by the executive com­
mittee, with one member being designated as the chairman 
by the executive committee.
2. The term of each Committee member shall be three years, 
with initial terms staggered to provide for three expira­
tions at the end of each of the first three years.
3. Members of the Committee shall be eligible to serve 
only two three-year terms in addition to a partial term in 
the beginning or to the unexpired portion of a term.
4. Committee members shall not serve concurrently as a 
member of the Committee and of either the executive committee 
or the peer review committee.
5. A majority of the Committee members must be present to 
constitute a quorum. (With respect to a quorum for a hearing, 
see section 4.2(c) of the Rules of Procedure for the Imposi­
tion of Sanctions.)
6. A member of the Committee shall be excluded from all 
deliberations with respect to his firm or, if he has or 
believes he has a conflict of interest, with respect to any 
other firm (see section 3.11 of Rules of Procedure for the 
Imposition of Sanctions).
7. Affirmative votes of a majority of the Committee members 
eligible to vote shall be required for action on all matters 
relating to specific member firms. If less than five Committee 
members are eligible to vote on such a matter, the executive 
committee shall appoint an additional member(s) to the Com­
mittee, who shall be a partner or retired partner of a member
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firm that is not represented on the Committee, who shall 
not be concurrently a member of the executive committee 
or the peer review committee, and whose responsibilities 
and authority shall be restricted to the matter involving 
the specific member firm. On matters not involving speci­
fic member firms, such as administrative and procedural 
matters, a majority of the Committee members present at a 
meeting and voting shall be required for action.
8. The meetings and proceedings of the Committee and any 
of its task forces and all related information available
to the Committee and any of its task forces shall be treated 
as confidential, except that the executive committee may 
authorize public disclosure of information with respect to 
any investigation or sanction.
9. The Committee's files and its meetings shall be open at 
all times to members of the Public Oversight Board and its 
representatives on a confidential basis, except that, after 
giving the firm concerned an opportunity to present its views 
and after consultation with the executive committee, the Public 
Oversight Board may make public disclosure of information
thus obtained which it deems necessary in the interest of the 
profession or the public.
The Committee shall have whatever staff it needs to perform its 
functions.
III. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
In carrying out its duties, the Committee shall give primary 
consideration to the significant interests of the public as outlined 
in section I, and shall also seek to deal fairly with the legitimate 
interests of member firms. In this connection, the Committee shall 
take into consideration in deciding upon its course of action that 
substantial incentives are already in place for a firm and individuals 
in such firm to adhere to professional standards in the performance 
of the audit function, including penalties and publicity resulting 
from court and SEC actions, sanctions resulting from peer reviews
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pursuant to membership requirements of the Section, and dis­
ciplinary proceedings against individuals by the AICPA and 
state professional societies and boards. It shall also consider 
both the importance to the public interest of having a prompt 
investigation and the fact that substantial prejudice to a 
firm or individuals in that firm could occur if the Committee 
were to commence and continue an investigation while the firm 
or individuals in it are involved, or about to be involved, in 
a court proceeding or a proceeding or investigation by the SEC, 
a grand jury, or other governmental body.
A firm shall cooperate in furnishing information to the 
Committee and in any investigation of the firm or of the case 
initiated by the Committee unless it can demonstrate to the sat­
isfaction of the Committee (a) that pending litigation or other 
proceeding or investigation is directly related to the subject 
of the inquiry and that there is a likelihood that such litiga­
tion, proceeding or investigation will be unduly influenced by 
the firm's providing the requested information and (b) that the 
need for such information as of the date requested is not suf­
ficient to override the interest of the firm or individuals in 
avoiding prejudice in such litigation or other proceeding or 
investigation. Also, the firm has no obligation to provide the 
Committee with information that would invade the attorney-client 
or other privilege or the litigation work product of the firm or 
any of its partners or employees.
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IV. INFORMATION TO BE REPORTED TO AND SCREENED BY THE COMMITTEE
All member firms shall report to the Committee, within 30 days 
of service on them of the first pleading in the matter or within 
30 days of joining the Section if later,1 any litigation (including 
criminal indictments) against them or their personnel, or any 
proceeding or investigation publicly announced by a regulatory 
agency, commenced on or after November 1, 1979 (not including 
additional proceedings arising out of or related to facts involved 
in litigation originally filed prior to November 1, 1979), that 
involves clients or former clients that are SEC registrants and that 
alleges deficiencies in the conduct of an audit or reporting thereon 
in connection with any required filing under the Federal securities 
laws.2 The initial report shall identify the litigation and be 
accompanied by copies of the complaints or indictment or other 
charges filed with the courts involved.
With respect to matters reported under the requirements of the 
preceding paragraph, member firms shall report to the Committee 
additional proceedings, settlements, court decisions on substantive 
issues, and the filing of appeals within 30 days of their occurrence. 
Member firms may also report such other information with respect to 
such matters as they consider appropriate.
1
Since the Committee is not expected to be appointed before December
1979, the first report by member firms is to be filed by January 31,
1980.
2 An allegation in such formal litigation, proceeding or investigation that 
a member firm or its personnel have violated the Federal securities 
laws in connection with services other than an audit for an SEC regi­
strant shall be reported and is included in the definition of "case."
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The term "case," as used hereinafter, refers to an engagement 
or engagements with respect to which there are allegations that a 
member firm with respect to a report or reports on the financial 
statements or related financial data of an SEC registrant failed to 
observe generally accepted auditing standards, whether or not liti­
gation is involved.3 Hereinafter, the term "firm" refers to a member 
firm.
The Committee shall screen information that comes to its atten­
tion through (a) the reporting requirement referred to above, or
(b) other sources when the cases are determined by the Committee to 
be of sufficient public interest, provided such cases do not involve 
litigation commenced prior to November 1, 1979.
The procedures for reporting litigation by each firm shall be 
reviewed in the triennial peer reviews. Also, the Committee's staff 
shall review compliance with the reporting requirements by monitoring 
published accounts of litigation that are available to it.
V. COORDINATION WITH THE PROFESSIONAL ETHICS DIVISION
The Committee shall prepare, in cooperation with the profes­
sional ethics executive committee, and submit to the SEC Practice 
Section's executive committee for approval, a memorandum setting 
forth the policies and procedures to be followed in coordinating 
the activities of the Committee with those of the committees of 
the Professional Ethics Division.
3See footnote 2.
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VI. SCREENING PROCEDURES
The Committee shall screen the information discussed in 
section IV to determine whether (1) to monitor developments in 
the case without investigation of the firm or the case, pending 
the conclusion of litigation or other proceeding or investigation;
(2) to investigate the firm without investigating the case;
(3) to recommend investigation of the case to the executive com­
mittee; and/or (4) to close its files on the case. Such deter­
minations may be changed from time to time as a result of informa­
tion available to the Committee.
In deciding what action to take or recommend, the Committee 
shall consider such available relevant information as is needed to 
make such a decision, including the date and results of the most 
recent peer review of the firm and when the next peer review is 
scheduled. The Committee may request additional information from 
the firm, or have one or more representatives visit the firm, to 
obtain such additional information as could reasonably be expected 
to be a part of the screening process.
The Committee shall complete its original screening of informa­
tion with respect to a case expeditiously, ordinarily within 90 days 
of the date of the first Committee meeting after the case has first 
been reported, unless additional time is reasonably required.
VII. MONITORING PROCEDURES
When the Committee monitors developments in a case without 
investigation of the firm or the case, it shall consider any new 
information it receives to determine whether to continue the
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monitoring, to initiate an investigation of the firm, to recommend 
an investigation of the case to the executive committee, or to close 
its files on the case.
VIII. INVESTIGATIONS— GENERAL POLICIES
The purpose of an investigation of a firm or of a case shall be 
to determine whether one or more of the following conditions exist:
1. Quality controls are inadequate in a firm (including any 
segment, such as an office or a specialized industry practice).
2. There has been a material departure from generally 
accepted auditing standards or a material failure to 
comply with quality control standards by the individuals 
responsible for the engagement in question (such indi­
viduals ordinarily being limited to the partner and manager 
on the engagement and other partners involved in decisions 
affecting the engagement).
3. There is a need for reconsidering the adequacy of cer­
tain generally accepted auditing standards or quality control 
standards.
The Committee shall establish the scope of any investigation 
of a firm undertaken without investigating the case itself (see 
section IX). The executive committee shall establish the general 
scope of any investigation of a case (see section X). While the 
persons responsible for the investigation may carry out some of 
the procedures that might be included in a peer review, such an 
investigation should not be as extensive as a peer review of the 
firm conducted in accordance with the Section's Standards for 
Performing and Reporting on Quality Control Compliance Reviews.
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Depending upon the extent and complexity of the investiga­
tion, a Committee member may perform it with the assistance of the 
Committee staff, or a task force may be appointed by the Committee 
to perform it. (A Committee member who conducts an investigation 
is precluded from serving as a member of a hearing body with respect 
to that case.) If a task force is appointed, it generally would be 
comprised of three or five partners or retired partners of firms, 
with the number and background of its members dependent on the 
complexity of the matter under investigation. The member firm 
being investigated shall be advised of the names of the members of 
the task force and their firms. If there is a possible conflict of 
interest, the member firms shall have the opportunity to request 
reconsideration of any proposed task force member.
Upon completion of its investigation, the task force (or 
such other persons who may conduct an investigation) shall submit 
its findings and recommendations to the Committee, which shall 
consider such findings and recommendations and determine what 
action is appropriate. If the Committee concludes that it will 
conduct a hearing to consider whether to recommend sanctions, it 
shall notify the firm in the manner prescribed in the Rules of 
Procedure for the Imposition of Sanctions.
If the Committee concludes that certain generally accepted 
auditing standards or quality control standards may need to be 
modified, it shall recommend to the executive committee that the 
matter be referred to the appropriate AICPA technical committee for 
action.
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The Committee shall consider corrective measures voluntarily 
taken by the firm with respect to its quality control policies and 
procedures or its personnel in deciding what further action, if 
any, should be taken.
If a firm fails to supply information to the Committee or its 
representatives in accordance with the procedures specified herein, 
such failure shall constitute a basis on which the Committee may 
recommend to the executive committee that sanctions be imposed on 
the firm. The Committee shall hold a hearing in accordance with 
the Section's Rules of Procedure for the Imposition of Sanctions to 
determine whether the firm has failed to supply information reasonably 
requested of it and what sanction should be recommended.
IX. INVESTIGATIONS OF MEMBER FIRMS
Following screening or monitoring, the Committee may decide 
to investigate a firm without investigating the case. Such an 
investigation could include, for example, one or more of the 
following:
1. A review of certain of the firm's quality control 
policies and procedures, or a review of compliance with 
those policies and procedures by certain offices or 
individuals.
2. A review of other engagements performed by the firm's 
office or offices or by the personnel involved in the case 
or of other engagements in the same industry as in the case.
3. Interviews of the firm's personnel with functional 
responsibility for a specialized industry if the case 
involves such an industry.
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Consideration shall also be given to any corrective action 
the firm has taken, including any action with respect to indi­
viduals involved in the case.
X. INVESTIGATIONS OF CASES
Following screening, monitoring, or investigation of a member 
firm, the Committee may decide to recommend that the executive 
committee authorize an investigation of the case. However, the 
Committee will not ordinarily recommend that the executive com­
mittee authorize an investigation of a case that is the subject of 
a court proceeding or a proceeding or investigation by the SEC, a 
grand jury, or other governmental body until such matters are con­
cluded. During that period, the Committee may monitor developments 
or make an investigation of the firm, without investigating the 
case. In determining whether there should be an investigation of 
the case after litigation is concluded, the Committee and the 
executive committee may consider whether the public interest has 
been safeguarded in other ways.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the Committee may decide that 
particular cases are of such significance to the public interest 
that the importance of investigation of the case outweighs any 
possible prejudice to the firm and that such an investigation should 
not be deferred. In such an instance, the Committee shall request 
an authorization from the executive committee before proceeding to 
investigate the case.
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Before recommending to the executive committee that an 
investigation of a case be instituted, the Committee shall advise 
the firm of its intention to make such a recommendation and shall 
give the firm (through counsel or otherwise) an opportunity to 
present its views in writing as to whether such recommendation 
is appropriate in the circumstances. If the recommendation is 
made to the executive committee, the firm shall be given an 
opportunity to express its views in writing to the executive com­
mittee.
When an investigation of a case has been authorized by the 
executive committee, the Committee shall proceed promptly with 
its investigation.
XI. DISPOSITION OF CASES
The Committee shall submit periodic reports to the executive 
committee concerning cases on its agenda.
The Committee may close its files on a case whenever it 
concludes that further action by it is not necessary, except in 
the following instance. When the executive committee has authorized 
an investigation of a case, only the executive committee can auth­
orize that the files on the case be closed.
The Committee shall consider the need to recommend sanctions 
to the executive committee when the Committee has found that 
material departures from generally accepted auditing standards or 
quality control standards have occurred, or when it has found that
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a firm has not been cooperative in providing information. Such 
sanctions shall be recommended only after findings have been made 
in a hearing held in accordance with the Section's Rules of Pro­
cedure for the Imposition of Sanctions.
One or more of the following sanctions may be recommended for 
a firm:
1. Requirements for corrective measures not voluntarily 
taken by the firm.
2. Additional requirements for continuing professional 
education.
3. Special or accelerated peer review (the cost of which 
is to be paid for by the firm being reviewed), with the 
possibility of special attention being given to the quality 
controls of the firm as they relate to particular offices 
or individuals and with the peer review committee taking 
whatever action it deems appropriate as a result of the 
peer review under its administrative procedures.
4. Admonishment, censure or reprimand.
5. Monetary fine.
6. Suspension from membership in the Section.
7. Expulsion from membership in the Section.
The public file will include a copy of the documents setting 
forth sanctions approved by the executive committee with respect 
to member firms.
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Exhibit VI
SEC PRACTICE SECTION 
AICPA DIVISION FOR CPA FIRMS
RULES OF PROCEDURE 
FOR THE IMPOSITION OF SANCTIONS
November 29, 1979
11
FOREWORD
This manual of rules of procedure has been prepared for 
the use of members of certain committees of the SEC Practice 
Section of the AICPA Division for CPA Firms in connection with 
proceedings related to the imposition of sanctions under section 
IX of the Organizational Structure and Functions document of the 
section. The affected committees are the executive committee, 
the special investigations committee, and the peer review com­
mittee. It has also been prepared for the information of those 
member firms that may be a party to such a proceeding.
The procedures described in this manual are significantly 
different from those in a proceeding at law. Hearings conducted 
under these procedures are, for the most part, informal in nature. 
The formal rules of evidence do not apply.
The overriding objective of this manual is to provide for an 
orderly proceeding, achieve a fair result, and adequately safeguard 
the rights of member firms and individuals that may become a party 
to a proceeding.
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1. GENERAL
1.1 Authority to Conduct Proceedings
1.2 Use of Hearings
1.3 Applicability of Rules of Procedure
1.4 Nature of Hearings
1.5 Role of the Hearing Body
1.6 Parties to the Proceeding
2. THE RIGHTS OF PARTIES
2.1 Right to Appear
2.2 Right to Present Evidence and to Cross-Examine
2.3 Right to Copy of Testimony
3. BASIC PRINCIPLES
3.1 Purpose of Rules of Procedure
3.2 Rules of Evidence
3.3 Notification of Proceeding
3.4 Answer to Notice of Hearing
3.5 Briefs and Memoranda
3.6 Postponements
3.7 Witnesses
3.8 Confidentiality of Proceedings
3.9 Full Hearing
3.10 Public Disclosure of Sanctions
3.11 Disqualification of Committee Members from
Participation in a Proceeding
3.12 Hearing by the Executive Committee to Consider
Findings of Another Hearing Body
3.13 Effective Date of Decisions
4. CONDUCTING A HEARING
4.1 Responsibilities of the Presiding Officer
4.2 Order of Proceedings —  Initial Hearing
4.3 Order of Proceedings —  Hearing by the Executive
Committee to Consider Findings of Another 
Hearing Body
5. THE HEARING BODY'S DECISION
5.1 Decisions to be Made
5.2 Burden of Proof
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1 . GENERAL
1.1 Authority to Conduct Proceedings
The executive committee of the section is authorized (a) to 
impose sanctions on member firms either on its own initiative or 
on the basis of recommendations of the peer review committee or 
the special investigations committee and (b) to establish pro­
cedures designed to assure due process to firms in connection 
with proceedings related to the imposition of sanctions (herein­
after, "proceedings"). The peer review committee and the special 
investigations committee cannot impose sanctions; they can only 
make recommendations to the executive committee as to the sanctions 
that they believe should be imposed.
1.2 Use of Hearings
Proceedings conducted by components of the SEC Practice Section 
of the AICPA Division for CPA Firms involve formal hearings which 
enable the member firm to challenge or contest the charges or recom­
mendations being made.
1.3 Applicability of Rules of Procedure
The rules of procedure set forth in this manual become applicable:
(a) When the peer review committee or the special investi­
gations committee decides that it will conduct a hearing 
to consider whether to recommend to the executive com­
mittee the imposition of sanctions on a member firm.
(b) When the executive committee decides that it will conduct 
a hearing to consider imposing sanctions on a member firm.
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For purposes of these rules of procedure, sanctions that 
may be imposed on member firms are described in section IX.2 of 
the section's Organizational Structure and Functions document.
Once these rules of procedure become applicable to a pro­
ceeding, they are to be applied until a decision by the executive 
committee to impose sanctions becomes effective or the matter is 
otherwise disposed of.
1.4 Nature of Hearings
Hearings before the peer review committee, the special investi­
gations committee, and the executive committee (hereinafter the 
"hearing bodies") are designed to assist those bodies in developing 
sufficient facts on which to base a decision as to whether or not 
the imposition of sanctions or a recommendation to impose sanctions 
is appropriate in a particular case. Hearing procedures are informal 
to afford all parties maximum flexibility in presenting every side of 
an issue. Member firms may be represented by counsel. No hearings 
before hearing bodies shall be open to the public (see section 3.8).
1.5 Role of the Hearing Body
The hearing body determines whether or not sanctions should be 
imposed or recommended, as applicable. The hearing body consists of 
the respective committee sitting en banc unless for good reason one 
or more members of the respective committee are unable to sit or it 
is inappropriate for a member to hear and decide a particular case 
(see section 3.11); hearings shall not be conducted by panels or by 
hearing officers appointed for that purpose.
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1.6 Parties to the Proceeding
Only the affected firm and components of the SEC Practice 
Section are parties to the proceeding. Intervention by third 
parties in proceedings shall not be permitted.
2. THE RIGHTS OF PARTIES
2.1 Right to Appear
A party to a proceeding has the right to appear and be heard 
at a hearing. A member firm may be represented by counsel or other 
representatives. A hearing body is empowered to conduct a hearing 
in the absence of a representative of the member firm, provided that 
a Notice of Hearing has been properly served, the representative of 
the member firm has failed to appear at the hearing without good 
reason, and there is no compelling reason, in the view of the hearing 
body, not to proceed.
2.2 Right to Present Evidence and to Cross-Examine
A party to a proceeding has the following rights in a hearing:
(a) To present evidence.
(b) To present arguments on issues relevant to the 
subject of the proceeding.
(c) To cross-examine witnesses present at the hearing.
2.3 Right to Copy of Testimony
A member firm that is a party to a proceeding may purchase a 
copy of the transcript of the hearing. Any person who gives evidence
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as a witness may purchase a copy of the transcript of his 
testimony. The fee for photocopying the transcript will be 
determined from time to time by AICPA staff.
3. BASIC PRINCIPLES
3.1 Purpose of Rules of Procedure
Although hearings conducted by the hearing bodies are 
informal, these rules of procedure have been adopted to insure 
fairness during the orderly disposition of proceedings before 
hearing bodies.
3.2 Rules of Evidence
In hearings governed by these rules of procedure, the formal 
rules of evidence applicable to proceedings at law or in equity do 
not apply, and evidence that would be inadmissable in a court of 
law may be received so long as it is relevant in the discretion of 
the presiding officer after due consideration of any objection by 
any party. The hearing body shall determine the weight to be given 
to such evidence.
3.3 Notification of Proceeding
Designated staff shall provide a member firm that is named as
a party to a proceeding adequate notice of such proceeding by causing
to be mailed to the member firm:
(a) Within 10 days after a hearing body decides that 
it will conduct a hearing (except hearings to be 
conducted by the executive committee to consider
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recommendations of other hearing bodies), an "Advice 
of Proceeding" stating that it has been determined 
that a hearing should be held, describing the charges 
that caused the hearing to be authorized, indicating 
the approximate date on which briefs and memoranda will 
be mailed to the member firm, and affording the member 
firm a reasonable time (not more than 60 days from the 
date of mailing) to respond, if the firm so desires.
The hearing body may determine after a response is made 
that a hearing would be inappropriate or unnecessary and 
terminate the matter at that time.
(b) At least 45 days prior to a proposed hearing date of any 
hearing body, a "Notice of Hearing" which shall contain 
a description of the matters to be dealt with at the 
hearing, the time and place of the hearing, and which 
shall be accompanied by a copy of all briefs and memoranda 
to be presented at the hearing in support of the charges 
or recommendations, as applicable, and by a list of the 
names and addresses of all witnesses, if any, scheduled 
to be called by the staff or other individuals with 
responsibility for presenting the charges or recommenda­
tions to the hearing body.
Such Advice or Notice, when mailed by registered mail, postage 
prepaid, addressed to the managing partner (chief executive officer) 
of the member firm at its last known business address as reflected 
in the section's public files, shall be deemed to be properly served. 
A copy of these rules of procedure shall accompany all Advices and 
Notices.
3.4 Answer to Notice of Hearing
The member firm is required to provide designated staff with 
an answer in writing to a Notice of Hearing. If mailed, such answer 
must be mailed registered mail, postage prepaid, at least 17 days 
before the hearing date specified in the notice. If hand delivered, 
delivery must be made to the AICPA offices at least 14 days before 
the hearing date specified in the notice. (A member firm is not
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required to answer an Advice of Proceeding.) The answer may be 
in the form of a reply memorandum to the briefs and memoranda 
accompanying the Notice of Hearing, or a request for postpone­
ment that states the reason for the request (see sections 3.5 and 
3.6).
3.5 Briefs and Memoranda
The staff or other individuals responsible for presenting the 
charges to a hearing body shall prepare a hearing memorandum and 
necessary appendices thereto containing the material upon which 
they intend to rely at the hearing.
The member firm shall furnish a reply memorandum to designated 
staff at least 14 days (or if mailed, 17 days) before (a) the hearing 
date specified in the Notice of Hearing or (b) such date as may be 
set after postponement of a hearing. The reply memorandum may con­
tain a denial of some or all of the charges, an explanation of some 
or all of the facts described in the hearing memorandum, any defenses 
being asserted, and any other information deemed relevant by the 
member firm. The reply memorandum shall contain a list of the names 
and addresses of all witnesses scheduled to be called by the member 
firm.
All material furnished to the hearing body shall be reproduced 
on 8½ x 11 paper, insofar as possible, by any standard duplicating 
process that provides legible copies.
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3.6 Postponements
At any time prior to the time set for the hearing, the pre­
siding officer of the hearing body is empowered to postpone the 
hearing. He shall, within 10 days from the date postponement is 
granted, reschedule the hearing. A postponement is not a matter 
of right and will be granted only upon the showing of good and 
sufficient reason.
A hearing body, when in actual session for the purpose of 
hearing a case, may postpone the hearing and designate a new date 
upon a showing of good cause. Such action shall be taken as a body 
and by majority vote.
Denial of postponement is not subject to an appeal to any 
other component of the section or of the AICPA which would pre­
vent or delay the holding of the hearing. However, this shall 
not prevent a member firm whose request for postponement is denied 
by the special investigations committee or by the peer review com­
mittee from asserting as a basis for rejecting the recommendations of 
such committee at any subsequent hearing before the executive com­
mittee that its rights were prejudiced by the denial of its request 
for a postponement.
3.7 Witnesses
Both the representatives of the member firm and the staff or 
other individuals with responsibility for presenting the charges to 
a hearing body may produce such witnesses as they deem appropriate.
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On motion of either of the parties to the proceeding, or of 
any member of the hearing body, witnesses will be excluded from 
a hearing except during such time as they are actually giving 
testimony. Witnesses at a hearing will not be sworn.
3.8 Confidentiality of Proceedings
No hearings before hearing bodies shall be open to the public. 
Briefs, memoranda, documentary evidence adduced at hearings, and 
stenographic transcripts of hearings shall be available for the 
confidential information of the following interested parties only 
except as otherwise provided in section 2.3:
(a) The parties to the proceeding.
(b) The executive committee of the SEC Practice Section.
(c) The Public Oversight Board or its representatives.
Members of hearing bodies, staff, parties to the proceeding, 
and witnesses should be appropriately advised of the need to 
maintain confidentiality.
Notwithstanding the above, after giving the firm concerned an 
opportunity to present its views and after consultation with the 
executive committee, the Public Oversight Board may make public 
disclosure of information thus obtained which it deems necessary 
in the interest of the profession or the public.
90
3.9 Full Hearing
Normally, once a hearing body is convened and assembled to 
hear a case, every effort will be made to reach a decision while 
it is convened and all parties shall be prepared to present their 
full case at that time. However, a member firm shall have the 
opportunity, if it so requests, to submit post-hearing briefs or 
memoranda within 10 days of the completion of a hearing. In such 
circumstances, or with the consent of the presiding officer, the 
staff or other individuals with responsibility for presenting the 
charges to the hearing body also may submit post-hearing briefs 
or memoranda.
3.10 Public Disclosure of Sanctions
When a decision is made by the executive committee to impose 
sanctions pursuant to section IX of the section's Organizational 
Structure and Functions document, the executive committee shall 
decide, by a majority of its members present and voting, on the 
form of the notice of the case and the decision to be published, 
along with the name of the member firm, in a membership periodical 
of the Institute. No such public disclosure shall be made until 
a decision to impose sanctions has become effective.
Information in the section's nonpublic files concerning matters 
that are the subject of pending proceedings, matters that may result 
in initiation of a proceeding, and matters referred to other com­
ponents of the AICPA, are to be held in confidence. However, the
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executive committee may authorize public disclosure of information 
with respect to the existence of an investigation or the imposition 
of a sanction.
3.11 Disqualification of Committee Members from Participation in 
a Proceeding
The following preclude a committee member from participating in 
any part of a proceeding:
(a) The committee member's firm has performed the most 
recent peer review of the affected member firm's 
accounting and audit practice or the committee member 
has served on a review team or on a quality control 
review panel in connection with the affected member 
firm's most recent peer review.
(b) The committee member's firm has performed a peer review 
of the affected member firm's accounting and audit 
practice for a year coinciding with or preceding 
(depending on the timing of the triennial reviews)
the year in which a significant audit failure or 
other identifiable incident that is the subject of 
the proceeding is alleged to have taken place or the 
committee member served on a review team or on a quality 
control review panel in connection with such a peer 
review.
(c) The committee member's firm is the subject of the proceeding.
(d) The committee member believes he could not be impartial 
and objective with respect to the charges or has a con­
flict of interest. (A committee member who conducts an 
investigation and/or presents charges to a hearing body 
is precluded from serving as a member of a hearing body 
with respect to that case.)
For purposes of this section, a retired partner of a member firm 
shall be considered in the same category as an active partner for a 
period of three years after retirement.
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3.12 Hearing by the Executive Committee to Consider Findings 
of Another Hearing Body
The executive committee shall be convened as a hearing body 
to consider sanctions recommended by the peer review committee or 
the special investigations committee. At such hearing, the exec­
utive committee shall consider the entire record of the original 
hearing body together with such new relevant evidence or addi­
tional memoranda as the member firm may desire to bring before 
it. A summary of such new evidence and any additional memoranda 
shall be filed with the member firm's answer to the Notice of 
Hearing (see section 3.4). The record also may be supplemented by 
any additional evidence which the chairman of the executive com­
mittee considers to be relevant and of sufficient importance to 
merit consideration or review.
3.13 Effective Date of Decisions
A decision by the executive committee to impose sanctions 
shall become effective as prescribed by the executive committee, 
but within 15 to 30 days from the date of the decision.
4. CONDUCTING A HEARING
4.1 Responsibilities of the Presiding Officer
The chairmen of the executive committee, the special investiga­
tions committee and the peer review committee, respectively, serve 
as the presiding officer when such committees assemble as hearing 
bodies.
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If the chairman is disqualified from participation in the 
proceeding, a presiding officer will be elected by majority vote 
of the members present and voting. The presiding officer is 
authorized to hold conferences for the simplification or settle­
ment of issues; take action necessary to maintain order; rule on 
motions and procedural questions arising during the hearing; call 
recesses or adjourn the hearing; examine witnesses; determine the 
admissibility of evidence; and take such reasonable actions as 
may be necessary to provide for a fair and orderly hearing.
4.2 Order of Proceedings —  Initial Hearing
The following is an outline of the order of proceedings for 
a hearing under these rules.
(a) The presiding officer calls the session to order, 
appoints a secretary, and identifies the case by 
name and number. He determines that a reporter is 
present and prepared to make a stenographic record 
of the hearing.
(b) The presiding officer requests that the representa­
tives of the member firm and counsel, if any, appear.
(c) The secretary identifies the staff or other indi­
viduals with responsibility for presenting the 
charges to the hearing body, and counsel for the 
section, if present, and the reporter. He calls 
the roll of the members of the hearing body by 
name and firm, identifying those members, if any, 
who had disqualified themselves as members of a 
hearing body on the specific case. The secretary 
announces for the record whether a quorum is present, 
a quorum of a hearing body being a majority of those 
members of the respective committee who have not dis­
qualified themselves from participating in the pro­
ceeding, but not less than five.1
If less than five members of the special investigations committee 
or the peer review committee, respectively, are eligible and able 
to serve on a hearing body, the matter shall be referred to the 
executive committee, which may appoint an individual(s) to serve 
on the hearing body.
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(d) If no representatives of the member firm are present, 
the presiding officer may proceed if he determines on 
the record that it is appropriate to do so.
(e) The presiding officer states for the record a brief 
summary of the subject of the hearing and the 
authority for holding it.
(f) The presiding officer states that the hearing will be 
conducted under these rules of procedure, noting in 
particular the informal nature of the hearing, especially 
as it relates to rules of evidence, and the need to main­
tain confidentiality.
(g) The presiding officer allows the parties to the pro­
ceeding to state for the record any objections they 
have to any prehearing proceedings, such as service 
of the Advice of Proceeding or Notice of Hearing, and 
to make any prehearing motions they have, such as a 
request for postponement (see section 3.6).
(h) The presiding officer requests the parties to the pro­
ceeding to identify their witnesses for the record.
(i) The presiding officer requests the person representing 
the SEC Practice Section, or counsel, to present the 
evidence against the member firm. In the course of 
this presentation, any exhibits to be introduced as 
evidence are passed to the representative of the 
member firm for inspection. They are then passed to the 
presiding officer, who indicates orally whether they are 
to be admitted. The presiding officer should see that 
all documentary and physical evidence is marked for 
identification and that a list is kept that describes 
the exhibit and its identification.
(j) The presiding officer permits the following individuals 
to question witnesses called by the representatives of 
the SEC Practice Section, or counsel, upon completion of 
their testimony:
(i) The representative of the member firm, or 
counsel.
(ii) Members of the hearing body.
(k) The presiding officer requests the representative of 
the member firm, or counsel, to present any evidence 
in support of their defense, following the same pro­
cedure in (i) above.
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(l) The presiding officer permits the following individuals 
to question witnesses called by the representative of 
the member firm, or counsel, upon completion of their 
testimony:
(i) The representative of the SEC Practice Section, 
or counsel.
(ii) Members of the hearing body.
(m) The presiding officer permits the person presenting 
evidence against the member firm to offer rebuttal 
evidence.
(n) The presiding officer permits the representative of 
the member firm, or counsel, to make a closing state­
ment which is then followed by the closing statement of 
the person presenting evidence against the member firm.
(o) If the member firm does not request the opportunity 
to submit a post-hearing brief or memorandum (see 
section 3.9), the presiding officer requests that all 
individuals, other than the members of the hearing 
body, retire from the hearing room.
(p) The hearing body determines by majority vote in execu­
tive session its disposition of the case by polling all 
participating members, including the presiding officer 
(see section 5). In the event the hearing body is 
unable to reach a decision during the executive session, 
it may adjourn the executive session to such later date 
as it shall determine.
(q) If a decision is reached immediately after the hearing, 
all parties to the proceeding present prior to executive 
session and the reporter are recalled for the purpose of 
recording the decision. If a decision cannot be reached 
immediately after the hearing or the parties are given
an opportunity to submit post-hearing briefs or memoranda, 
the parties to the proceeding shall be informed of the 
decision by letter mailed within 10 days of the decision 
in the same manner as a Notice of Hearing (see section 3.3)
4.3 Order of Proceedings —  Hearing by the Executive Committee 
to Consider Findings of Another Hearing Body
A hearing before the executive committee to consider the
recommendations of the peer review committee or the special
investigations committee with respect to sanctions that should
be imposed on a member firm shall be conducted substantially in
accordance with section 4.2.
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5. THE HEARING BODY'S DECISION
5.1 Decisions to be Made
The hearing body must make the following determinations 
based on the evidence presented at the hearing:
(a) The facts in issue.
(b) Whether the facts, as determined, support the 
charges brought against the member firm.
(c) Whether the charges brought are a violation of 
the membership requirements.
(d) Whether and what sanctions are appropriate.
(e) What the effective date of the final decision should 
be.
5.2 Burden of Proof
A determination that the facts support the charges brought 
against the member firm must be based on the preponderance of 
the evidence.
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Exhibit VII
SPECIAL INVESTIGATIONS COMMITTEE 
SEC PRACTICE SECTION 
1979-1980
Member
Firm or Former 
Firm Affiliation
Term
Expires*
Rholan E. Larson, 
Chairman
Partner, Larson, Allen, 
Weishair & Co. 1982
Leroy Layton Retired, former partner, 
Main Hurdman & Cranstoun 1982
John B. O'Hara Partner, Price Waterhouse 
& Co. 1982
Edwin P. Fisher Partner, Arthur Andersen 
& Co. 1981
Leon P. Otkiss Retired, former partner,
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co. 1981
David Wentworth Partner, McGladrey, 
Hendrickson & Co. 1981
Harry L. Laing Partner, A. M. Pullen & 
Company 1980
Harry F. Reiss, Jr. Retired, former partner, 
Ernst & Whinney 1980
Lawrence J. Seidman Retired, former partner, 
Seidman & Seidman 1980
*Concides with date of AICPA annual meeting.
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Exhibit VIII
THE SEC PRACTICE SECTION OF THE 
AICPA DIVISION FOR CPA FIRMS
POSITION PAPER OF TASK FORCE ON 
CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE 
AUDITOR'S WORK ENVIRONMENT
March 1980
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AICPA American Institute of Certified Public Accountants1211 Avenue of the Americas, New York, New York 10036 (212) 575-6200
March 17, 1980
To the Members of the:
AICPA Board of Directors 
Public Oversight Board 
Private Companies Practice Section 
Executive Committee
Some months ago, the Executive Committee of the SEC Practice 
Section appointed a task force to consider certain portions 
of the Report of the Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities 
related to certain aspects of the auditor's work environment.
The task force has prepared a position paper on that subject, 
and the paper has been accepted by the Executive Committee.
The position paper has been distributed to the firms that are 
members of the SEC Practice Section. A copy of the paper, 
together with a transmittal letter that summarizes its findings, 
is enclosed for your information.
I would be happy to answer any questions you might have about 
this position paper.
Sincerely,
A. E. MacKay 
Chairman
SEC Practice Section 
Executive Committee
AEM:jmk
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AICPA American Institute of Certified Public Accountants1211 Avenue of the Americas, New York, New York 10036 (212) 575-6200
March 17, 1980
To Managing Partners of 
Member Firms of the 
SEC Practice Section
Dear Colleague:
Enclosed is a copy of a position paper of the task force 
appointed by the SEC Practice Section Executive Committee 
to consider certain conclusions of the Commission on Audi­
tor's Responsibilities (Cohen Commission). The position 
paper, which has been accepted by the Executive Committee, 
sets forth the task force's considerations and conclusions 
about portions of the Cohen Commission's Report (the Report; 
issued in 1978) that are related to the auditor's work 
environment and that resulted, in part, from a profession­
wide survey of selected partners and staff members of CPA 
firms. The position paper also sets forth recommendations 
to firms about steps that they should take in response to 
concerns expressed in the Report.
The Cohen Commission expressed concern about specific audit 
practices that it believed cause or result from "excessive 
time pressures." Serious consideration must be given to 
these concerns; but, in light of several factors relating 
to the results of the Cohen Commission's survey and develop­
ments in the profession (discussed in the position paper), 
the task force believes that there is not persuasive evidence 
that firms have sacrificed audit quality —  because of time 
pressures on audits or otherwise. Furthermore, it believes 
that those concerns are not as serious or pervasive as some 
apparently have inferred from the Report and, most importantly, 
that there are pervasive positive factors at work on audit 
quality and specifically on those concerns.
105
-2-
Accordingly, the task force recommends that firms should 
continue to reassess, and otherwise monitor the effective­
ness of, their policies and procedures on the use of time 
budgets, the level of audit partner supervision, and the 
signing off for audit work. Feedback from firms' employees 
to the partners would provide useful information for such 
monitoring activities and might be obtained through various 
means that ordinarily exist already within firms. Accordingly, 
the task force does not believe that a firm needs to conduct 
an internal survey to obtain such feedback; however, some 
firms might decide to do so.
I hope you will carefully consider this position paper. How­
ever, please note that it does not establish membership 
requirements or peer review standards.
Sincerely,
A. E. MacKay 
Chairman
SEC Practice Section 
Executive Committee
AEM:jmk
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POSITION PAPER OF TASK FORCE ON
CERTAIN ASPECTS OF THE 
AUDITOR'S WORK ENVIRONMENT
1. The SEC Practice Section of the AICPA Division for CPA 
Firms appointed a task force to consider certain conclusions 
of the Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities (Cohen 
Commission) that were related to the auditor's work environ­
ment. This position paper sets forth the considerations, 
conclusions, and recommendations of the task force with 
respect to certain portions of the Cohen Commission's Report(1) 
that are discussed in the Report's section, "Management 
Policies and Procedures of Public Accounting Firms and Their 
Effect on Independence."
COHEN COMMISSION REPORT
2. The Cohen Commission studied, among other things, 
aspects of the business environment that affect the indepen­
dence of auditors. The Cohen Commission concluded that 
possible excessive competition, rather than lack of it, 
appears to present a problem to the public accounting profes­
sion today.
(1) Commission on Auditors' Responsibilities, Report, 
Conclusions and Recommendations (New York: AICPA, 
1978) referred to herein as "Report."
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3. In explaining that conclusion, the Cohen Commission
stated that its research on selected cases involving alleged
"audit failures," its conferences with SEC staff, technical
partners of CPA firms and others, and its survey of partners'
and staff members' attitudes "provide persuasive evidence
that time and budget pressures frequently cause substandard
auditing" (Report, p. 109). The Cohen Commission's survey,
(2)frequently referred to as the "Rhode Survey," (2) was a 
questionnaire sent to present and former partners and staff 
members of auditing firms, principally to determine their 
attitudes and practices related to the quality of their work 
and independence. Although a single cause of time and 
budget pressures was not determined, one probable cause was 
believed to be excessive competition among firms to offer 
lower fees -- but the Cohen Commission was unable to document 
this relationship.
4. Furthermore, the Report (p. 115) stated, "Although
there are other factors, the Commission believes that excessive 
time pressures are one of the most pervasive causes of audit 
failures." The Report discussed specific audit practices 
that the Cohen Commission believed cause or result from the
(2) John Grant Rhode, The Independent Auditor's Work 
Environment: A Survey, Commission on Auditors' 
Responsibilities Research Study No. 4 (New York: AICPA, 
1978).
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excessive time pressures. Those discussions and related 
conclusions that are addressed later in this position paper 
are summarized in paragraphs 5 through 7.
5. The Cohen Commission stated that excessive time pressures 
are caused in some cases by inappropriate policies and 
procedures of firms concerning audit time budgets. The 
budgets have a negative effect on the auditor's performance
if they are unrealistic or if variances from them are used 
inappropriately for evaluating personnel performance. 
Unrealistic time budgets result from their being established 
too low, either from arbitrary decisions or from invalid 
information about time spent in the prior year audit because 
chargeable hours were underreported.
6. The Cohen Commission also stated that excessive time 
pressures result, in some cases, in the undesirable situations 
of inadequately supervised audits and of auditors having 
signed for completing audit steps (not covered by another 
compensating step) when they had not performed the work. As 
to the former situation, the Cohen Commission believed its 
research found that many of the alleged audit failures fit 
the general picture of a "partner supervising fifteen or 
twenty engagements, many with identical year ends, working 
considerable overtime, unable to find adequate time to
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review work papers, and faced with several crucial decisions, 
some of which were ultimately made incorrectly" (Report, 
page 115). As to the latter situation, the Cohen Commission 
indicated that 58% of respondents to the Rhode Survey who 
were still in public practice had at least once in their 
career signed for work not performed and that the situation 
was the most serious deficiency revealed by the survey, "for 
it reflects on the auditor's own control system for the 
audit" (Report, p. 116).
7. With respect to these audit practices, the Cohen 
Commission made the following recommendations:
"Public accounting firms should not abandon time budgets, 
but they must improve current methods, particularly for 
the evaluation of variances and their effect on the 
evaluation of personnel.... Any revision of the budgeting 
process should include careful consideration of safe­
guards to avoid arbitrarily establishing excessively 
low budgets because fees have been set too low" (Report, 
pp. 117-118).
"Firms [should] immediately undertake to conduct studies 
to determine the extent of conditions revealed by the 
Commission's study and the effects on their practices" 
(Report, p. 118).
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CONSIDERATION OF COHEN COMMISSION'S CONCLUSIONS
8. Serious consideration must be given to any indications 
that some audits may be performed at a substandard level, 
that excessive time and budget pressures may be the cause of 
substandard audits, and that inadequate supervision and 
improper sign-off practices may result from those pressures 
or for any other reasons. As discussed in the "Task Force 
Conclusions and Recommendations" section below, public 
accounting firms should take steps to mitigate the possible 
effect of any such conditions. However, the task force 
believes that several factors concerning the results of the 
Rhode Survey and developments in the profession, which are 
discussed in paragraphs 9 through 16, should be considered 
in judging the pervasiveness and significance of such 
conditions and in determining the appropriate response.
Interpretation Of Rhode Survey Results
9. The results of the Rhode Survey are subject to a 
variety of interpretations regarding the effect of time 
pressures on audit quality. As indicated earlier, the Cohen 
Commission's Report (p. 116) stated that 58% of respondents
to the Rhode Survey who were still in public practice answered 
"Yes" to the question, "During the course of an audit, have
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you ever signed off a required audit step, not covered by 
another audit step, without completing the work or noting 
the omission of procedures?" The available details of those 
responses are interesting. For example, those responses can 
be summarized from page 121 of the Rhode Survey report
as follows:
Percentage 
of Responses
Choice of Answers Available for the Question 
(A respondent was instructed to check 
one of the following.)
0.2 Yes, frequently (10 or more times) even though 
you were not satisfied with the extent of the 
examination in that area
2.9 Yes, infrequently (less than 10 times) even 
though you were not satisfied with the extent 
of the examination in that area
3.1 [Subtotal]
7.9 Yes, frequently, (10 or more times) although 
you were satisfied with the extent of the 
examination in that area
46.7 Yes, infrequently (less than 10 times) although 
you were satisfied with the extent of the 
examination in that area
57.7 [Subtotal -- i.e., the 58% referred to earlier]
42.3 No, never in my auditing experience
100.0 [Total]
As indicated by this summary, only 3.1% of all respondents 
(who were still in public practice) had engaged in the 
conduct described in the question and were not satisfied
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with the extent of the examination in that area. Page 121 
of the report (2) also indicates that the comparable figure 
for those no longer in public practice was 4.3%. Furthermore, 
it would appear from correlated questions in the Survey that 
in a substantial number of instances "the omission of required 
work was discovered" (Report, pp. 179-180) -- presumably, 
discovered in the review process.
10. The details of the key question discussed in paragraph 9 
do raise concerns regarding the adequacy of audit documentation 
and the inclusion of unnecessary procedures in audit programs 
(that is, overauditing). However, the task force believes 
that those concerns -- although important -- are not so 
serious as to imply that a pervasive condition of "substandard 
audits" exists where essential audit procedures are being 
omitted because of excessive time pressures.
Effects of Developments in the Profession
11. Certain profession-wide developments have occurred
since the publication of the Cohen Commission's report that 
should have the effect of enhancing audit quality: issuance
of SAS No. 22 on planning and supervision, actions by the 
AICPA Division for CPA Firms with related membership require­
ments, measures taken by the AICPA to discipline its individual-
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member CPAs, and the inauguration of separate authoritative 
pronouncements on quality control standards.
12. Statement on Auditing Standards No. 22, Planning and 
Supervision, was issued in March, 1978. Generally it discusses, 
among other things, the development of an overall strategy
for the expected conduct and scope of an audit, the early 
identification of areas that may need special consideration, 
and the continuous participation of the partner throughout 
the audit. The task force believes that this SAS should 
serve to reduce the possibility of inadequate partner 
supervision. It also should help to increase the information 
base from which the audit time budgets are prepared (see 
paragraphs 3 and 4 of the SAS).
13. The AICPA Division for CPA Firms began in 1977 and 
continued in 1978 and 1979 to develop its activities and to 
make both the SEC Practice Section and the Private Companies 
Practice Section fully effective. This division has provided 
the profession an organizational structure through which 
regulatory requirements, disciplinary actions, and sanctions 
can be imposed on CPA firms.
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14. The task force believes that two of the SEC Practice 
Section's membership requirements, in particular, should 
serve to improve audit quality on a profession-wide basis: 
the concurring review of a firm's audit reports as to SEC 
engagements and the periodic peer review of a firm's quality 
controls. (The Private Companies Practice Section has a 
similar membership requirement for periodic peer review.) 
Programs developed by the SEC Practice Section and contained 
in its Peer Review Manual specifically identify time budgets 
and supervision on selected audits as areas that ordinarily 
should be subjected to the appropriate peer-review procedures.
15. In addition to the actions taken to regulate CPA firms, 
the AICPA has taken measures to strengthen its effectiveness 
in disciplining its individual-member CPAs. These measures 
provide for, among other things, a public accountability of 
the ethics committee and trial board with respect to disci­
plinary matters, and a continuing review of the entire 
disciplinary machinery applicable to the profession to 
determine how it can be made more effective. Several state 
boards of accountancy and state societies of CPAs also have 
increased their disciplinary activities.
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16. A newly-formed senior committee of the AICPA issued in 
November, 1979 its first Statement on Quality Control Standards 
(SQCS) entitled "System of Quality Control for a CPA Firm."
This statement incorporates the elements of quality control 
discussed in SAS No. 4, "Quality Control Considerations for 
a Firm of Independent Auditors" issued December, 1974, which 
date probably was too recent for the statement to have been 
adequately reflected in the mid-1976 Rhode Survey. SQCS No.
1 requires, among other things, that firms have a system to 
assure that quality control considerations are addressed, 
that the quality control policies and procedures are commu­
nicated to the firms' personnel, and that the system is 
monitored. Furthermore, in 1978, examples were provided by 
a special committee to illustrate the types of policies and 
procedures that firms might establish for each element of 
quality control specified in SAS No. 4 and later incorporated 
into SQCS No. 1 (see AICPA Professional Standards, Volume 2,
QC Section 200, "Quality Control Policies and Procedures for 
Participating CPA Firms").
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TASK FORCE CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
17. Competition among firms and time pressures on audits 
necessarily exist because public accounting firms operate in 
a business environment similar to that of the firms they 
audit. Thus, the firms' operational goals of growth and 
profitability may at times appear to conflict with goals 
relating to quality of work. However, the task force believes 
there is not persuasive evidence that firms have sacrificed 
quality. More specifically, based primarily on the consider­
ations discussed in paragraphs 9 through 16, the task force 
believes that the Cohen Commission's concerns about inadequate 
supervision and improper sign-off practices are not as 
serious or pervasive as some apparently have inferred from 
its Report. Most importantly, the task force believes there 
are pervasive positive forces at work on audit quality and 
specifically on the Cohen Commission's concerns -- those 
forces resulting from the effects of developments in the 
profession described in paragraphs 11 through 16.
18. The need to balance apparently conflicting goals requires 
firms to establish, clearly and decisively, their goals for 
quality of work. Also, the fact that inappropriate audit 
practices were identified to any extent by the Cohen Commission 
emphasizes that firms should be watchful to determine that 
their quality goals are in fact being achieved. Accordingly,
117
firms should continue to reassess, and otherwise monitor the 
effectiveness of, their policies and procedures concerning 
the use of audit time budgets, the level of audit partner 
supervision, and the signing off for audit work. The task 
force believes that this reassessment and monitoring of 
certain aspects of the auditor's work environment should be 
made in order to reduce, to the lowest possible level, the 
types of concerns discussed in paragraphs 4 through 6. In 
making the reassessment, firms should consider the matters 
discussed in paragraphs 19 through 22; and in otherwise 
monitoring the effectiveness of their prescribed policies 
and procedures, firms should consider the matters discussed 
in paragraphs 23 through 25.
19. Firms should communicate to their personnel the objectives 
of the time-budgeting process and should indicate that audit 
time budgets should be realistic and kept in proper perspective 
in evaluating personnel performance. Firms also should 
communicate a policy of not permitting excessively low 
budgets to be arbitrarily established. Furthermore, such 
communication should establish procedures for the preparation 
and use of audit time budgets, and for the appropriate 
recording of audit time spent, in order that excessive time 
pressures are not created. Comments in the Report (p. 117) 
on time budgets might be useful to firms in developing or 
revising such communication.
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20. As indicated in SAS No. 22, the extent of partner 
supervision appropriate in a given instance depends on many 
factors, including the complexity of the audit and the 
qualifications of the persons performing the work. Therefore, 
in addition to having established policies and procedures 
concerning the nature, timing and extent of partner supervision 
of audits, firms should plan for and maintain adequate 
numbers of supervisory personnel.
21. The signing off for a required audit procedure without 
completing the work or noting the omission of the procedure 
is undesirable and unacceptable behavior. This is true even 
where an individual believes that the procedure is not 
necessary, is covered by another procedure, or for any other 
reason. In order that the partner and other supervisors can 
make audit decisions based on reliable information, firms 
should provide guidance to their personnel on, generally, 
the form and content of working papers and, specifically, 
the proper procedures for signing off for (or otherwise 
indicating) work performed and the appropriate manner for 
noting a change in the planned procedure or a decision not 
to perform the procedure.
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22. The specific form and extent of communications to 
firms' employees -- that provide guidance on audit time 
budgets, partner supervision, and sign-off practices -- will 
vary depending on the size, structure, and nature of practice 
of the firms. For example, some firms might decide that a 
portion of an employee code of conduct, containing strong 
admonitions, might be the appropriate means to set forth the 
responsibilities of each professional in the firm with 
respect to those matters. Such firms also might decide to 
request a confirmation from each professional as to compliance 
with the code of conduct. Alternatively, some firms might 
decide that periodic meetings of their professionals, in 
which those matters are discussed, would be equally effective.
23. Firms also should continue to monitor the effectiveness 
of their prescribed policies and procedures concerning the 
three matters discussed earlier (audit time budgets, partner 
supervision, and sign-off practices) and to determine whether 
any modifications thereto are required. The task force 
believes that feedback from firms' employees to the partners 
concerning those three matters would provide useful information 
for such monitoring activities.
24. The feedback discussed in paragraph 23 might be obtained 
through various means that ordinarily exist already within 
firms. Those means, for example, might include:
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On-the-job supervision, during the performance of the 
audit, as part of which discussions are held with firm 
employees and observations of audit conduct are made by 
supervisory personnel.
Procedures, required by SAS No. 22, for resolving any 
significant differences of opinion among firm personnel 
concerning accounting and auditing issues on the audit.
A debriefing session held at the conclusion of the 
audit and attended by the key members of the audit 
team.
The firm's inspection program required by SQCS No. 1.
Periodic counseling sessions for each employee of the 
firm.
25. Each of the activities listed in paragraph 24 would not 
necessarily provide employee feedback on one or all of the 
three matters discussed earlier. The task force believes, 
however, that a combination of those activities listed -- or 
others not shown -- can provide a firm such feedback that is 
sufficient in relation to the firm's overall monitoring 
activities, its size, structure, and nature of its practice.
121
26. Accordingly, the task force does not believe that a 
firm needs to conduct an internal survey to obtain feedback 
with respect to the auditor's work environment in the firm; 
however, some firms might decide to do so. The recommendations 
in paragraphs 18 through 25 apply to a firm regardless of 
whether it performed an internal survey. Therefore, a firm 
might proceed, without performing an internal survey, to 
implement the above-discussed recommendations as appropriate -- 
based on, among other things, an assessment of the effectiveness 
of prescribed policies and procedures that address the 
concerns expressed by the Cohen Commission.
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